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MONITORING IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT 
Stephen Lee* 
More than two-thirds of the unauthorized immigrant population—roughly 8 
million out of 11.2 million—is in our nation’s workforce, and growing evidence 
suggests that unauthorized workers are more likely than their authorized 
counterparts to experience workplace-related violations. Although scholars have 
begun shifting their focus to the agencies empowered to regulate immigrants in the 
workplace, important questions remain unanswered. Why, for example, has the 
Department of Labor, our nation’s top labor enforcement agency, struggled to 
protect unauthorized workers against this exploitation despite the scope and 
seriousness of the problem? And why has Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 
our nation’s top immigration enforcement agency, resisted taking into account the 
labor consequences of their actions? Our ignorance is becoming increasingly 
indefensible given that agencies often have the final word within an immigration 
universe characterized by legislative stasis. A closer look reveals a peculiar 
dynamic: ICE has relatively little interest in regulating the relationship between 
employers and unauthorized workers, while the DOL has a relatively high interest 
but lacks the autonomy to effectively do so—a dynamic that tends to foster 
interagency conflict, ultimately enabling the problem of labor exploitation to 
persist. What is the way out? Borrowing the insights of administrative law 
scholars, this Article argues that increasing the ability of the DOL to monitor 
immigration enforcement decisions can help minimize the externalities that ICE 
actions ordinarily force the DOL to absorb. This monitoring framework constrains 
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the ex ante stage of decisionmaking, complements existing immigration 
scholarship (which has tended to focus on ex post remedies like expanding the 
ability of the DOL to issue temporary visas), and pushes back on ICE’s law 
enforcement culture (which has traditionally resisted the incorporation of labor 
norms). Moreover, the monitoring framework is able to track evolving problems of 
coordination and to identify emerging vulnerabilities as the Executive’s 
immigration enforcement authority continues to grow and outpace the 
development of adequate constraints on the exercise of that authority. 
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INTRODUCTION 
More than two-thirds of the total unauthorized immigrant population—
roughly 8 million out of 11.2 million—is in our nation’s workforce,1 and growing 
evidence suggests that unauthorized workers are more likely than their authorized 
                                                                                                            
    1. See PEW RESEARCH CTR., UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANT POPULATION: 
NATIONAL AND STATE TRENDS, 2010, at 1 (2011), available at http:// 
pewhispanic.org/files/reports/133.pdf. Although this class of noncitizens is often referred to 
by a variety of names, I use the term “unauthorized” because it avoids the untoward 
normative implications of the term “illegal” alien or immigrant and it better comports with 
the relevant statutory provision than the term “undocumented.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(3) 
(2006) (“[T]he term ‘unauthorized alien’ means, with respect to the employment of an alien 
at a particular time, that the alien is not at that time either (A) an alien lawfully admitted for 
permanent residence, or (B) authorized to be so employed by this chapter or by the Attorney 
General.”).  
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counterparts to experience labor violations.2 Determining where immigration law 
ends and where labor law begins can be difficult.3 Scholars have recently begun 
grappling with questions related to the promises and the perils associated with the 
agencies empowered to regulate immigrants in the workplace.4 This conversation 
merits greater attention given that agencies increasingly have the final word within 
an immigration system characterized by legislative stasis.5 A closer look at the 
agencies populating this system reveals a contentious and negotiable set of 
relationships. This is an area of regulation filled with turf battles, where some 
agencies lose power6 and others are created to fill vacuums,7 and where agencies 
                                                                                                            
    2. See CHIRAG MEHTA ET AL., UNIV. OF ILL. AT CHI., CTR. FOR URBAN ECON. 
DEV., CHICAGO’S UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS: AN ANALYSIS OF WAGES, WORKING 
CONDITIONS, AND ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTIONS 27 (2002), available at 
http://www.urbaneconomy.org/sites/default/files/undoc_wages_working_64.pdf. 
    3. So persistent is this indeterminacy that even mere shifts in emphasis by 
experts are deemed noteworthy. Prior to being appointed Immigration and Naturalization 
Service (“INS”) commissioner, Doris Meissner noted that in regard to the Immigration 
Reform and Control Act of 1986 (“IRCA”), “When enacted, employer sanctions were 
perceived as labor-related immigration law. In retrospect, it is increasingly clear that they 
are, and should be treated as, immigration-related labor law.” Robert Bach & Doris 
Meissner, Employment and Immigration Reform: Employer Sanctions Four Years Later, in 
THE PAPER CURTAIN: EMPLOYER SANCTIONS’ IMPLEMENTATION, IMPACT, AND REFORM 281, 
291 (Michael Fix ed., 1991). 
    4. See, e.g., Jayesh M. Rathod, Immigrant Labor and the Occupational Safety 
and Health Regime, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 479 (2009); Leticia M. Saucedo, 
Immigration Enforcement Versus Employment Law Enforcement: The Case for Integrated 
Protections in the Immigrant Workplace, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 303 (2010). For the most 
part, scholars have focused on the role that private organizations can play in facilitating the 
assertion of labor rights. See, e.g., Jennifer Gordon, Transnational Labor Citizenship, 80 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 503 (2007); Jennifer Gordon, We Make the Road by Walking: Immigrant 
Workers, the Workplace Project, and the Struggle for Social Change, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. 
L. REV. 407 (1995); see also, e.g., JANELLE S. WONG, DEMOCRACY’S PROMISE: IMMIGRANTS 
AND AMERICAN CIVIC INSTITUTIONS (2006); S. Karthick Ramakrishnan & Celia Viramontes, 
Civic Spaces: Mexican Hometown Associations and Immigration Participation, 66 J. SOC. 
ISSUES 155 (2010). But see Janice Fine & Jennifer Gordon, Strengthening Labor Standards 
Enforcement Through Partnerships and Workers’ Organizations, 38 POL. & SOC’Y 552, 
560–62 (2010) (advocating for a model of labor enforcement where public agencies partner 
with private organizations).  
    5. See Cristina M. Rodríguez, Constraint through Delegation: The Case of 
Executive Control over Immigration Policy, 59 DUKE L.J. 1787, 1796–1803 (2010) 
(describing the current immigration system as suffering from problems of “stasis”). 
    6. After being lodged in the Department of Labor (“DOL”) for the first half of 
the 20th century, the Immigration and Naturalization Service was transferred to the 
Department of Justice in 1940. Reorganization Plan No. V, 5 Fed. Reg. 2223 (June 14, 
1940). 
    7. The INS was dissolved in 2002 and replaced by several new agencies within 
the newly created Department of Homeland Security. See Homeland Security Act of 2002, 
Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 6 U.S.C.). 
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wrangle for supremacy and hurl accusations of sabotage at one another.8 They 
even impersonate one another from time to time. 
Consider the following examples. A cheese manufacturer in Tennessee 
knowingly hired several unauthorized migrant workers and then refused to pay 
them. The workers staged a protest, were detained by Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (“ICE”), and eventually obtained U visas9 to assist in the prosecution 
of the employer. Meanwhile, the U.S. Attorney filed charges against those same 
workers for using fraudulent social security numbers to obtain employment.10 One 
hand takes what the other gives. In another case, unauthorized workers in 
Goldsboro, North Carolina gathered for what appeared to be a mandatory safety 
training conducted by the Occupation Safety and Health Administration 
(“OSHA”). Upon arrival, the workers were detained by ICE officials who had 
posted notices in a strategy of bait-and-switch, causing OSHA officials—who had 
no knowledge of the meeting—to immediately set out on a campaign to repair 
damaged relationships with the surrounding unauthorized community.11 In still 
other cases, immigration officials have responded to employer “tips” and “leads” 
even where it is abundantly clear that the employer is trying to report (and thus 
deport) the very unauthorized workers it knowingly hired in the first place.12 In 
these cases and others, immigration enforcement agency officials could have 
considered the labor consequences of their decisions but chose not to do so, while 
labor agency officials would have preferred to coordinate enforcement efforts but 
were powerless to force any such conversation.13 
Against this backdrop, two questions concerning agency coordination 
emerge as central to solving the puzzle of workplace enforcement. First, why has 
the Department of Labor, our nation’s top labor enforcement agency, struggled to 
protect unauthorized workers against exploitative practices despite the scope and 
seriousness of the problem? And second, why has ICE, our nation’s top 
immigration enforcement agency, resisted taking into account the labor 
                                                                                                            
    8. See KITTY CALAVITA, INSIDE THE STATE: THE BRACERO PROGRAM, 
IMMIGRATION, AND THE I.N.S. 113–14 (1992). 
    9. These are temporary visas, created under the Victims of Trafficking and 
Violence Protection Act, which provide to the victims of certain crimes in exchange for help 
prosecuting the perpetrator. See Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 
2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, § 1513(a)(2)(B), 114 Stat. 1464, 1534 (codified as amended at 8 
U.S.C. § 1101 (2006)). 
  10. See Monica Mercer, Cases Highlight Competing Interests in Immigration 
Policy, CHATTANOOGA TIMES FREE PRESS, Mar. 9, 2010, http://www.timesfreepress.com/ 
news/2010/mar/09/cases-highlight-competing-interests-in/. 
  11. See Steven Greenhouse, An Immigration Sting Puts Two Federal Agencies at 
Odds, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2005, at A11 [hereinafter Greenhouse, Immigration Sting]; 
Steven Greenhouse, U.S. Officials Defend Ploys to Catch Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 
2006, at A8 [hereinafter Greenhouse, Officials Defend Ploys]. 
  12. See Stephen Lee, Private Immigration Screening in the Workplace, 61 STAN. 
L. REV. 1103, 1120–23 (2009). 
  13. See REBECCA SMITH ET AL., ICED OUT: HOW IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT 
HAS INTERFERED WITH WORKERS’ RIGHTS 15–28 (2009), available at 
http://nelp.3cdn.net/75a43e6ae48f67216a_w2m6bp1ak.pdf. 
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consequences of its actions?14 The answers to these questions can be traced to a 
peculiar dynamic: ICE, whose primary mission is to target noncitizens for 
detention and deportation, has relatively little interest in regulating the employer–
unauthorized worker relationship, while the DOL has a relatively high interest but 
lacks the autonomy to effectively do so. Although ICE and the DOL are both 
charged with the duty of regulating employers for hiring unauthorized workers, 
their relationship has largely been an asymmetric one. ICE has been able to 
effectively dictate the terms of our nation’s workplace enforcement strategy and 
has largely been resistant or indifferent to the labor consequences of its decisions. 
Taken together, these dynamics, especially when combined with other 
exacerbating factors,15 tend to disrupt agency coordination and enable labor 
exploitation to persist.  
Moreover, traditional administrative law fixes do not offer easy or 
obvious solutions to the problem of asymmetric enforcement authority in the 
workplace. For example, as administrative law scholars well know, the President is 
free to use his oversight and monitoring powers to coordinate the enforcement 
priorities of the various agencies within the executive branch of the federal 
government. And President Obama has, more than his predecessors, demonstrated 
a willingness to use this power to bring immigration enforcement goals in line with 
labor enforcement goals. This oversight power, combined with the election of a 
President sympathetic to the interests of unauthorized workers and the appointment 
of a Secretary of Labor who shares those sympathies, should spell the end of the 
Department of Homeland Security’s (“DHS”) triumph over the DOL and the 
displacement of labor interests in the workplace. Yet, there are plenty of signs that 
DHS officials, who are steeped in a work culture geared toward law-and-order 
methods of regulation, have resisted the President’s entreaty to consider the labor 
consequences of their enforcement decisions. Change at the top offers no 
guarantee that change will easily follow at the bottom, at least in the divided world 
of workplace regulation. 
Another administrative law fix with intuitive appeal is agency splitting—
the breaking apart of an agency and reallocation of authority. If the problem is that 
DHS tends to target unauthorized workers to the exclusion of the employers who 
hire and exploit these workers, then agency-splitting advocates would suggest 
                                                                                                            
  14. Similar questions concerning mission orientation, enforcement discretion, 
and unauthorized migration could be posed of the U.S. Attorneys’ Offices. See, e.g., 
Norman Abrams, Internal Policy: Guiding the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, 19 
UCLA L. REV. 1 (1971); Ellen S. Podgor, Department of Justice Guidelines: Balancing 
“Discretionary Justice,” 13 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 167 (2003). Still, the bulk of this 
Article focuses on the enforcement constraints imposed on ICE in order to minimize 
distractions from the primary purpose of this Article, which is to develop the monitoring 
framework in the context of workplace enforcement. Questions concerning how labor 
agencies interact with U.S. Attorneys’ Offices, and the consequences that flow from such 
interactions, are better left to be answered as a part of my larger project examining the 
intersection of labor, immigration, and criminal law. See infra Part IV.  
  15. In prior work, I address some of the consequences of allowing employers to 
screen their workers for immigration status. See Lee, supra note 12. This Article moves up 
the lens of analysis to focus on the agencies themselves. 
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transferring the latter power to labor agencies like the DOL, an agency with a 
mission orientation that might better accommodate an enforcement mandate 
involving employers. But past administrative experiments that even suggested that 
the DOL was empowered to directly regulate employers for immigration violations 
proved costly; often, labor officials ended up alienating unauthorized workers, the 
very cross-section of workers interagency collaboration should protect.16 
What is the solution? In this Article, I argue that one potential solution to 
the persistent problem of asymmetric workplace regulation is interagency 
monitoring—empowering labor agencies, like the DOL, to monitor DHS to ensure 
that immigration officials account for the labor consequences of their enforcement 
decisions. Although immigration scholars are still struggling to understand the 
dynamics affecting agency interactions, this Article borrows insights developed by 
administrative law and other public law scholars who have been exploring these 
dynamics for years. In doing so, I explain that for most of its history, ICE has 
resisted targeting employers because doing so has rarely meshed well with its 
primary mission of detaining and removing noncitizens. Interagency monitoring 
provides an opportunity to achieve the kind of balancing act that immigration 
enforcement demands: It allows the DOL to indirectly inject workers’ interests 
into the workplace enforcement process without incurring the costs that flow from 
a direct intervention.  
Examining workplace enforcement through the lens of interagency 
monitoring offers at least three benefits to existing immigration scholarship. First, 
it provides a vocabulary and framework to help refine our understandings of why 
prior attempts by the Executive to coordinate agency actions have failed.17 
Developing a clearer picture of these coordination challenges is all the more 
important given that statutory reform remains elusive in this political environment. 
Second, it supplements the efforts made by a small but growing number of 
immigration scholars who have argued in favor of expanding the role of labor 
agencies in workplace enforcement. Although the details differ, the proposals 
offered by these scholars all share one common feature: expanding the ability of 
labor agencies to issue temporary visas to victims of workplace crimes.18 When 
ICE investigates a workplace and arrests unauthorized workers, some or all of 
these workers may be entitled to temporarily (and perhaps permanently) adjust 
their status despite their having engaged in unauthorized work. These visas 
intervene at the ex post stage and act as a check against screening errors. 
Interagency monitoring offers an alternative vision that focuses on constraining 
DHS decisions at the ex ante stage with the hope that doing so will force ICE 
officials to meaningfully coordinate their enforcement efforts from the beginning 
and not later down the line as an afterthought. Third and finally, interagency 
monitoring offers an institutional design account of an area of law that has been 
                                                                                                            
  16. See infra Part I.C.2. 
  17. See infra Part III.B. 
  18. See Kathleen Kim, The Trafficked Worker as Private Attorney General: A 
Model for Enforcing the Civil Rights of Undocumented Workers, 2009 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 
247, 308; Leticia M. Saucedo, A New “U”: Organizing Victims and Protecting Immigrant 
Workers, 42 U. RICH. L. REV. 891, 935–44 (2008). 
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scrutinized primarily for its substantive shortcomings.19 Holding the substance of 
the formal law as a constant, this Article examines the pressures, incentives, and 
constraints affecting agency interactions and how these interactions in turn change 
the scope of relief available under labor law.  
As this Article explains, the core of the problem is that ICE operates 
within an enforcement vacuum. For much of its history, ICE has been largely 
insulated against meaningful oversight as to its workplace enforcement decisions, 
enabling its officers to rely on tips, leads, and other information without 
considering whether an investigation enables a bad-actor employer to escape 
liability for labor violations or chills the reporting of labor violations by 
unauthorized workers. An ex ante solution, therefore, slows the process of moving 
from the receipt of information to implementing a full-blown investigation. For 
overzealous ICE officials, interagency monitoring induces a stop-and-think effect 
by requiring ICE officials to coordinate with the DOL officials who, by virtue of 
their worker-oriented mission, are focused on precisely those dynamics ICE 
officials are likely to resist or ignore. And for well-intentioned ICE officials who 
have no desire to allow immigration law to displace labor law, monitoring also 
offers the benefit of the DOL’s expertise, which can counteract the blind spots that 
develop within ICE’s field of vision. 
To be clear, I am not suggesting that the ex ante solution should displace 
the ex post visa solution. The two strategies apply pressure at different stages of 
enforcement, and I see them as complementary. But the monitoring solution does 
offer something that the other model does not: it helps minimize the “downstream” 
effects of enforcement decisions.20 In other words, ICE’s unconstrained 
enforcement power has generated externalities that impact the DOL, chill the 
reporting of labor violations, and ultimately frustrate the DOL’s ability to identify 
exploitative employers.  
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I sets out to show that (1) in theory, 
ICE and the DOL are empowered to jointly regulate the workplace on relatively 
equal terms; but (2) in practice, workplace enforcement powers have been 
distributed asymmetrically between immigration and labor agencies, mostly 
because of the different informational challenges facing each agency; (3) a part of 
this pathology can be traced to the lack of effective oversight; and (4) traditional 
administrative law solutions, like executive oversight or agency splitting, do not 
present viable options. Taken together, these observations lead to the conclusion 
that the DOL and other labor agencies face near-insurmountable obstacles in 
detecting employers who exploit unauthorized workers, and this detection problem 
can be traced to ICE’s ability to make enforcement decisions with little DOL input. 
Of course, problems of interagency coordination are not new. In Part II, I 
show that similar regulatory problems in other contexts have been addressed 
through monitoring arrangements, where one agency monitors the decisions made 
by the lead agency. Specifically, this body of literature grapples with the problem 
                                                                                                            
  19. See, e.g., Hiroshi Motomura, The Rights of Others: Legal Claims and 
Immigration Outside the Law, 59 DUKE L.J. 1723, 1746–62 (2010). 
  20. See infra Part III.D. 
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of an agency shirking enforcement goals because those goals present a mismatch 
with its mission orientation.21 In this scenario, officials in the lead agency resist, 
ignore, or fail to fully appreciate their secondary obligations for reasons of work 
culture or expertise (or both). The monitoring agency, therefore, seeks to remind 
the lead agency—either through gentle nudging or through the coercion of law—
that they must fulfill enforcement obligations, even secondary ones. 
Part III then examines the case of workplace enforcement through the 
lens of interagency monitoring. Here, I explain that the goal of regulating 
employers has presented a mismatch given ICE’s primary mission orientation of 
identifying and removing noncitizens, an orientation that has proven to be fairly 
resistant to labor norms and goals. Over the course of the last quarter century, 
labor and immigration officials have made some efforts to coordinate their 
enforcement strategies. This Part also explains why worksite enforcement 
strategies continued to displace labor law despite these coordination efforts. As I 
explain, whether and to what extent immigration officials considered the labor 
consequences of their enforcement decisions was a matter that was largely left to 
self-regulation. Labor officials lacked the ability to monitor the process by which 
immigration officials moved from targeting a workplace to investigating it. This is 
precisely the sort of problem that interagency monitoring can help solve. By 
allowing the DOL to exercise oversight at the enforcement stage, immigration 
officials are forced to consider the secondary and complementary interests bound 
up in labor enforcement. I also identify and allay some concerns about expanding 
the DOL’s role at the ex ante enforcement stage. 
In addition to easing longstanding interagency conflicts, Part IV explains 
that the monitoring framework provides another benefit: It helps identify emerging 
vulnerabilities in workplace enforcement. The tensions that have characterized 
relationships between immigration and labor agencies will inevitably migrate as 
the number of agencies involved in workplace enforcement increases. Specifically, 
the growing involvement of criminal law enforcement officials—especially local 
law enforcement officers—creates more opportunities for bad-actor employers to 
suppress labor dissent by way of state criminal laws.22 Although many scholars 
have done work at the intersection of labor and immigration law, and of 
immigration law and criminal law, I explain that one area that we can ignore only 
at our peril is the intersection of labor, immigration, and criminal law. I then 
conclude. 
I. ASYMMETRIC ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY 
For the last quarter century, our nation’s interior immigration 
enforcement strategy has been fixated on employers and has tried to prevent them 
from hiring unauthorized migrants. This Part teases out one strand of this history 
                                                                                                            
  21. One example to which these scholars often point is a pro-energy agency 
ignoring its congressionally imposed environmental obligations, with the solution being to 
empower pro-environmental agencies to act as a monitor—an agency that encourages (and 
in some cases forces) the lead agency to account for the environmental consequences of its 
decisions. See infra Part II. 
  22.  See infra Part IV. 
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that has often been overlooked: Congress envisioned this strategy to be jointly 
implemented by immigration agencies and labor agencies. In practice, however, 
immigration agencies—first the Immigration and Naturalization Service and now 
ICE—have been able to dictate the terms of this interagency relationship. 
Moreover, traditional administrative fixes, like presidential monitoring and agency 
splitting, have proven to be ineffective.  
A. Workplace Enforcement and Interagency Coordination 
Congress passed the Immigration Reform and Control Act in 1986.23 One 
of its central purposes was to target employers as a part of the federal strategy to 
deter unauthorized migration. Prior to 1986, employers could hire workers without 
regard to immigration status. Thereafter, employers were prohibited from hiring 
workers without first verifying their immigration status. Failing to carry out these 
verification duties could result in civil penalties, and knowingly hiring 
unauthorized workers could lead to criminal penalties.24 The decision to target 
employers was grounded in the logic that prohibiting employers from hiring 
unauthorized migrants would disable the “magnet” that attracted unauthorized 
migrants in the first place.25  
By disabling this magnet, Congress endeavored to both deter 
unauthorized migration and protect U.S. workers against the harm of depressed 
wages caused by an influx of unauthorized workers willing to work for less. 
Preventing employers from hiring unauthorized workers would dry up job 
opportunities, which would remove any incentive for the unauthorized worker to 
migrate in the first place. At the same time, regulating hiring decisions also 
constricted an employer’s ability to exploit workers—authorized and unauthorized.  
Lawmakers were well aware of the administrative challenges of 
implementing the employer sanctions provision. Three in particular stood out. 
First, although IRCA’s sanctions provision applied to all U.S. employers, it would 
have been impossible for the INS to audit even a significant minority of U.S. 
employers.26 Resource, time, and political constraints required the INS to make 
hard choices among a variety of potential enforcement targets. As a result, there 
                                                                                                            
  23. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 
3359 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). 
  24. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a) (2006) (summarizing the grounds of liability); id. § 
1324a(e)(4)–(5) (summarizing civil penalties); id. § 1324a(f) (summarizing criminal 
penalties). 
  25. For a more comprehensive history of IRCA and employer sanctions 
generally, see Lee, supra note 12, at 1110–13, 1126–37; Michael J. Wishnie, Prohibiting 
the Employment of Unauthorized Immigrants: The Experiment Fails, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 
193, 198–204. 
  26. This challenge persists today given the large number of unauthorized 
immigrants within U.S. borders. As Jeffrey Manns observes, “[ICE] lacks the manpower, 
resources, and means to track down on its own the vast majority of undocumented aliens 
who do not register.” Jeffrey Manns, Private Monitoring of Gatekeepers: The Case of 
Immigration Enforcement, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 887, 937. 
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was an overriding sense that the INS would and should target employers in those 
industries most dependent on unauthorized labor.27  
A second concern was whether the INS was adequately equipped to 
effectively carry out IRCA’s new enforcement mandate against employers. Up 
until that point, the INS’s enforcement efforts focused primarily on unauthorized 
immigrants. Targeting employers meant that the INS staff needed to reorient their 
efforts to focus on citizens, and indeed, required changing and supplementing 
agency staff.28 In the years immediately following IRCA’s passage, the INS 
tailored its hiring priorities in order to build a staff with the requisite expertise to 
carry out this new mandate.  
Third and finally, the legislative activity surrounding the passage of 
IRCA suggests that Congress anticipated coordination problems, and accordingly, 
created a regulatory scheme that involved collaborations across the administrative 
state.29 The legislative history reflects a congressional desire for this new set of 
immigration laws to mesh with existing labor laws.30 Equally clear was Congress’s 
desire for the INS to work with the DOL in developing an enforcement strategy. 
Employers who sought out unauthorized workers often did so because such a 
workforce tended to be more compliant and less likely to assert labor rights. 
                                                                                                            
  27. IRCA was largely based on the findings of the Select Commission on 
Immigration and Refugee Policy. See Lee, supra note 12, at 1133 n.109; see also U.S. 
IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST: THE FINAL REPORT AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SELECT COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY 
(1981).  
  28. See Lee, supra note 12, at 1127 (describing the INS’s preference for hiring 
high-achieving college graduates to replace former border patrol guards in order to foster a 
more professional and civil relationship with employers as it attempted to implement 
IRCA). 
  29. See Kati L. Griffith, Discovering “Immployment” Law: The Constitutionality 
of Subfederal Immigration Regulation at Work, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 389, 442–43 
(2011). 
  30. The House Judiciary Committee Report explains: 
It is not the intention of the Committee that the employer sanctions 
provisions of the bill be used to undermine or diminish in any way labor 
protections in existing law, or to limit the powers of federal or state labor 
relations boards, labor standards agencies, or labor arbitrators to remedy 
unfair practices committed against undocumented employees for 
exercising their rights before such agencies or for engaging in activities 
protected by existing law. 
H.R. REP. NO. 99-682, pt. 1, at 58 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5662; see 
also H.R. REP. NO. 99-682, pt. 2, at 8–9 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5757, 5758 
(“[T]he committee does not intend that any provision of this Act would limit the powers of 
State or Federal labor standards agencies such as the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration, the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor, the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission, the National Labor Relations Board, or Labor 
arbitrators, in conformity with existing law, to remedy unfair practices committed against 
undocumented employees for exercising their rights before such agencies or for engaging in 
activities protected by these agencies. To do otherwise would be counter-productive of our 
intent to limit the hiring of undocumented employees and the depressing effect on working 
conditions caused by their employment.”). 
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Therefore, given the likelihood that an employer who violates U.S. immigration 
laws (by hiring unauthorized workers) would also violate U.S. labor laws (by 
exploiting those workers), the legislative history strongly suggests that Congress 
intended for the DOL to play a complementary role in regulating employers.31 
Indeed, IRCA explicitly empowered the DOL to review an employer’s 
immigration-related documents as a part of its labor enforcement efforts.32  
Another provision further supports the conclusion that Congress intended 
for a collaborative process to prevail in the implementation of employer sanctions. 
IRCA contained a self-study reporting provision, which requires the President to 
produce a “comprehensive immigration-impact report” every three years.33 The 
congressional commentary surrounding this provision reflects Congress’s 
preference for coordinated enforcement efforts. The presidential reporting 
requirement was designed, in part, to remedy the informational problems 
associated with a decentralized immigration system that relied on four separate 
cabinet-level agencies to implement immigration-related policy.34 Given the 
entrenched interests of each agency, the House Report observed: “Because of this 
diversification and the importance attached by each to its responsibilities, any 
attempt to establish meaningful flexibility in this country’s immigration program is 
difficult.”35 After summarizing and bemoaning the various failed attempts to 
consolidate immigration authority into a single entity, the House Report concluded 
that the President’s triennial findings would enable the political branches “to 
consider possible changes to them with the benefit of reliable and detailed data.”36 
Therefore, the allocation of worksite enforcement authority to both immigration 
and labor agencies was driven in part to encourage agencies to coordinate their 
efforts to overcome the regulatory challenges attendant to a fragmented 
immigration system. 
                                                                                                            
  31. The House Judiciary Committee Report notes: 
In order to assist employers in meeting their responsibilities under this 
legislation, the Attorney General is required to develop and disseminate 
forms to employers, referrers and recruiters. These forms will then be 
executed by employers, referrers and recruiters, as well as the person 
employed or referred and retained for inspection by INS and the 
Department of Labor. 
H.R. REP. NO. 99-682, pt. 1, at 56–57 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5660–
61 (emphasis added). 
  32. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(3) (2006) (“After completion of such form in 
accordance with paragraphs (1) and (2), the person or entity must retain a paper, microfiche, 
microfilm, or electronic version of the form and make it available for inspection by officers 
of the Service, the Special Counsel for Immigration-Related Unfair Employment Practices, 
or the Department of Labor . . . .” (emphasis added)).  
  33. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 401(a), 
100 Stat. 3359, 3440 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1364(a) (2006)).  
  34. See H.R. REP. NO. 99-682, pt. 1, at 89 (1986), reprinted in 1986 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5693 (noting that immigration policies are carried out by the 
Departments of State, Justice, Health and Human Services, and Labor). Today, five cabinet-
level agencies now regulate immigration with the creation of the Department of Homeland 
Security.  
  35. Id.  
  36. Id. 
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B. Asymmetric Enforcement Power 
Both ICE and the DOL lay claim to important regulatory authority over 
employers in terms of dealings with unauthorized workers. Under U.S. 
immigration laws, ICE has the power to punish employers for hiring unauthorized 
workers.37 Under U.S. labor laws—most relevantly the Fair Labor Standards Act38 
and the Occupational Safety and Health Act39—the DOL has the power to punish 
employers for workplace violations such as the nonpayment of overtime pay or 
exposing workers to unsafe conditions. In theory, this regulatory overlap creates 
conditions amenable to the joint, robust, and balanced policing of the workplace. 
In practice, however, the regulation of the workplace has been skewed in favor of 
immigration enforcement goals. Labor enforcement goals, to the extent they are 
considered at all, are often relegated to being an afterthought. This asymmetric 
allocation of power has allowed ICE to dictate whether and to what extent labor 
enforcement goals are met. As I explain below, the DOL has been largely 
powerless to disrupt this arrangement because of the different information-related 
challenges facing each agency. 
The DOL relies heavily on worker-initiated complaints to identify 
potential bad-actor employers. Therefore, a key part of the DOL’s regulatory 
strategy involves conveying accurate information to unauthorized workers about 
the beneficial services it offers. For obvious reasons, ICE does not rely on (nor 
does it expect) unauthorized workers to report employers. The very nature of 
ICE’s law enforcement mission often leads it to employ campaigns of 
misinformation—elaborate ruses designed to lure unauthorized immigrants out of 
the shadows and into the open for detention and deportation. The tension generated 
by these very different approaches often has the effect of sending mixed signals to 
unauthorized immigrants, which ultimately impedes the DOL’s ability to reach and 
gain the trust of unauthorized workers harmed in the workplace. 
Unauthorized immigrants do not often interact with public entities or 
other “law-wielding” entities. They avoid them. This, I am sure, surprises no one. 
But what might be underappreciated is the degree to which this distrust of 
immigration officials impedes the ability of “status-indifferent” or “status-neutral” 
public entities to help unauthorized migrants assert their rights. By “status-
indifferent,” I mean those agencies that are interested in helping unauthorized 
immigrants assert their rights or obtain benefits to which they are entitled without 
regard to their immigration status. Several agencies and institutions have no 
interest in a person’s immigration status, nor should they in the vast majority of 
cases. The challenge for these agencies, then, is to find ways to signal to 
                                                                                                            
  37. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(1)(A)–(B) (2006) (prohibiting the hiring of 
“unauthorized” noncitizens and imposing a mandatory verification requirement on all 
employers). An employer may also be punished for recruiting unauthorized migrants for 
work. See id. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) (subjecting to criminal penalties anyone who “encourages 
or induces an alien to come to, enter, or reside in the United States, knowing or in reckless 
disregard of the fact that such coming to, entry, or residence is or will be in violation of 
law”).  
  38. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2006). 
  39. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651–678 (2006). 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1974624
2011] MONITORING IMMIGRATION 1101 
unauthorized migrants that receiving help and aid from these agencies will not lead 
to adverse immigration consequences.  
Although immigration scholars are at the very early stages of developing 
a full picture of how unauthorized immigrants receive and sort information,40 a 
patchwork of reports, studies, and articles provides an important and useful 
glimpse of the challenges agencies and other entities face in reaching unauthorized 
immigrants. Consider the following examples. The Census Bureau is housed in the 
Department of Commerce and carries out the decennial task of gathering 
information about the U.S. population and economy. Encountering information 
pertaining to an individual’s immigration status is incidental to the Census 
Bureau’s primary task of ensuring an accurate accounting of the national 
population. But unauthorized immigrants are often unsure of this fact, thus 
requiring the Bureau to actively work to convey to residents that any information 
pertaining to their unauthorized status will not be shared with ICE.41 The costs of 
conveying this “friendly” message are borne in specific ways, especially as those 
messages confront the challenges of working across language differences. Even if 
an unauthorized immigrant is willing to complete a census survey, getting the 
process started requires having bilingual speakers. In multi-racial and multi-ethnic 
Queens, New York, for example, census workers have been forced to go out in 
groups that possess at least one Mandarin and one Korean speaker.42  
State and local law enforcement entities have also grappled with the 
challenges of communicating with and responding to the needs of immigrant 
communities. Despite all of the attention that state and local entities have received 
for the anti-immigrant ordinances passed by certain localities,43 the reality is much 
more complicated. Indeed, many state and local law enforcement officers have 
exhibited ambivalence toward the local enforcement of immigration laws. 
Although mainstream understandings of this issue tend to paint local law 
enforcement officials as openly embracing the responsibility of enforcing 
immigration laws,44 the reality is that police departments are much more mixed on 
the issue. A 2008 national study surveyed police chiefs from all around the country 
and found that more than half of the respondents characterized gaining the trust of 
immigrant communities as a priority for fear that failing to maintain such trust 
                                                                                                            
  40. See Adam B. Cox, Immigration Law’s Organizing Principles, 157 U. PA. L. 
REV. 341, 387–89 (2008) (identifying some areas of immigration law that could benefit 
from a more robustly developed set of information policies in relation to immigrants).  
  41. See Fernanda Santos, Door to Door, City Volunteers Try to Break Down 
Resistance to the Census, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2010, at A15 (“Illegal immigrants must be 
told, sometimes repeatedly, that the Census Bureau does not share information about 
individuals with any other government agency.”). 
  42. See id. 
  43. See Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Outside the Law, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 
2037, 2055–56 (2008) (summarizing some recent efforts). 
  44. See, e.g., Randal C. Archibold, Arizona Law Is Stoking Unease Among 
Latinos, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2010, at A11. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1974624
1102 ARIZONA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 53:1089 
would dry up community contacts, which are often the gatekeepers for 
investigating local street crimes.45  
Banks have also been active in trying to pierce through the veil of 
distrust. Unlike the Census Bureau and local law enforcement agencies, whose 
interest in unauthorized migrants flows from a broadly-conceived public mandate, 
banks, as private actors, are interested in unauthorized immigrants for their 
potential as consumers of financial services.46 Still, although banks are not public 
entities, they provide financial services that enable unauthorized workers to access 
and enjoy a more mainstream version of American social life. This, in part, 
explains why federal bank regulators have repeatedly stated that banks are not 
required to make distinctions on the basis of immigration status.47  
In theory, expanding the distribution of information could help correct 
unauthorized migrants’ mistaken (but understandable) belief that no public entity 
says what it means or does what it says. One might be tempted to conclude that the 
Census Bureau and the police need only get their message out and dial up their 
public relations campaigns. In other areas of the law, institutions—both private 
                                                                                                            
  45. See SCOTT H. DECKER ET AL., ARIZ. STATE UNIV., IMMIGRATION AND LOCAL 
POLICING: RESULTS FROM A NATIONAL SURVEY OF LAW ENFORCEMENT EXECUTIVES 2 
(2008), available at http://ccj.asu.edu/research/immigration-research-section/current-
project/immigration-and-local-policing-results-from-a-national-survey-of-law-enforcement-
executives/view. Sanctuary policies represent the most robust of this kind of local 
sentiment. A recent study by the Homeland Security Advisory Council confirms this 
finding. In a study evaluating the effects of the federal government’s Secure Communities 
program, the Council observed that the program had unintended local impacts:  
Secure Communities and other federal enforcement and removal 
programs do no operate in a vacuum. In many localities, police leaders 
have said that immigration enforcement policies are disrupting police–
community relationships that are important to public safety and national 
security. Law enforcement experts have stated that the trust that exists 
between police and immigrant communities can take years to develop 
and can remain tenuous despite the hard work of local law enforcement 
agencies.  
HOMELAND SEC. ADVISORY COUNCIL, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., TASK FORCE  
ON SECURE COMMUNITIES FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 24 (2001), available  
at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/hsac-task-force-on-secure-communities-findings-and-
recommendations-report.pdf; see also Rose Cuison Villazor, What Is a “Sanctuary”?, 61 
SMU L. REV. 133, 133–37 (2008). 
  46. Instead of seeking to build a trusting relationship with unauthorized migrants 
for the benefit of authorized immigrant and citizen members of the community, banks’ 
profit-maximizing impulse has kept their focus squarely on the unauthorized. As Ezra 
Rosser notes, “Today big banks, hungry for new growth areas, are clamouring to offer wire-
transfer services to immigrants.” Ezra Rosser, Immigrant Remittances, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1, 
32 (2008) (quoting Into the Fold: Americans Without Bank Accounts, ECONOMIST, May 6, 
2006, at 76). 
  47. These regulators, for the most part, seem to be agnostic toward the issue of 
banking the unauthorized, but to the extent they support it, it seems that mainstreaming 
these financial relationships facilitates the detection of fraud and money laundering. See 
John Coyle, The Legality of Banking the Undocumented, 22 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 21, 44–45 
(2007). 
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and public—often send signals that help decision-makers make better decisions.48 
But the challenge faced by entities like the Census Bureau, certain local police, 
and banks, is that when they send signals into the world, they can never be sure 
that they reach their intended audience. How can one tell whether someone is 
unauthorized, authorized, a citizen, or a noncitizen? And with the patchwork of 
agencies carrying out immigration-related duties, unauthorized immigrants have a 
hard time discerning which signals are genuine and which conceal ulterior 
motives. Thus, a dilemma emerges: Status-blind agencies speak but can never be 
sure who is listening, while unauthorized immigrants are listening, but can never 
be sure who is speaking.  
Even if a public entity is willing to internalize the costs of disseminating 
its friendly message, there is no guarantee that the intended audience will play the 
role of willing recipient. Immigrants can develop negative views and 
preconceptions toward public officials in their sending countries, which can 
foment distrust of U.S. officials. The challenge of breaking down the preconceived 
notion held by immigrants is not entirely unfamiliar to regulators. It is often 
articulated in terms of being a problem of culture or, more specifically, of 
immigrants having to overcome cultural barriers. Although there are dangers to 
relying too heavily on the explanatory powers of culture,49 where an immigrant 
hails from a country where corruption pervaded public life and where police 
officers and bank officials were viewed as the causes and beneficiaries of this 
corruption, she might reasonably conclude that similar officials cannot be trusted 
in the United States.50 In the parallel context of providing the benefits of police 
                                                                                                            
  48. See Matthew C. Stephenson, A Costly Signaling Theory of “Hard Look” 
Judicial Review, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 753, 767–75 (2006) (arguing that in the context of hard 
look review of administrative decisions, agencies can signal to reviewing courts their strong 
endorsement of a proposed policy by developing a high-quality record); see also Russell 
Korobkin, In Praise of Law School Rankings: Solutions to Coordination and Collective 
Action Problems, 77 TEX. L. REV. 403, 409 (1998) (arguing that one underappreciated 
function served by the U.S. News & World Report law school rankings is that they enable a 
high-achieving student to signal to future employers that “he is brainy or clever enough to 
be accepted by a more selective school”).  
  49. Leti Volpp makes the important point that cultural explanations, especially 
those that characterize immigrants as deviant, can be problematic for reasons of 
essentialism. See Leti Volpp, Feminism Versus Multiculturalism, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1181, 
1186–87 (2001). 
  50. Indeed, this is a part of the guidance that police officers receive to prepare 
for policing in immigrant communities. For example, one set of guidelines explains:  
A lack of trust towards government and public institutions, particularly 
banks, is shared by many immigrant groups. Because of the sometimes 
corrupt and unstable situations in their native countries, immigrants 
oftentimes do not trust banks to safeguard and protect their money. As a 
result, many immigrants keep their money and valuables at home or at 
their businesses, thus making them vulnerable to crime. 
INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, POLICE CHIEFS GUIDE TO IMMIGRATION 
ISSUES 21 (2007), available at http://www.theiacp.org/Portals/0/pdfs/Publications/
PoliceChiefsGuidetoImmigration.pdf; see also DECKER ET AL., supra note 45, at 4 (“Gaining 
cooperation . . . from immigrants, whether in the country legally or not, can be a difficult 
issue for law enforcement, which may face distrust, fear, or hostility from such groups.”).  
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protection, “immigrants are less likely than the general population to report to the 
police situations in which they have been victims or witnesses to crime.”51  
Given these informational challenges, those agencies whose investigative 
responsibilities depend on the cooperation of unauthorized immigrants are at a 
distinct disadvantage to those agencies that can carry out their missions 
independent of such cooperation. The DOL is uniquely dependent on tips, leads, 
and other external sources of information for initiating workplace investigations. 
Although it possesses the authority to investigate employers based on internally 
developed information, the majority of the DOL’s investigations begin in response 
to complaints filed by workers alleging labor violations against their employers.52 
Therefore, should the practice of reporting bad-actor employers be chilled—which 
happened in the past in response to certain ICE enforcement strategies—one 
practical consequence would be that employers could violate the labor rights of 
their unauthorized workers knowing that there was little to no chance of being 
investigated. In this way, the regulatory power wielded by the DOL and ICE is 
asymmetric. In theory, each agency possesses independent and equally legitimate 
authority to regulate employer relationships with unauthorized workers, but the 
reality has been that ICE dictates whether and to what extent the DOL is able to 
punish employers for exploiting their unauthorized workers.  
The enforcement practices of the previous administration provide the 
clearest example of such a dynamic. Under the Bush administration, ICE 
implemented an employer-friendly workplace enforcement strategy under which it 
largely ignored bad-actor employers and, in fact, welcomed tips and leads from 
employers even when the surrounding facts strongly suggested that they were 
reporting the very unauthorized workers they hired in the first place.53 This 
practice, not surprisingly, had the effect of inducing a compliant and exploitable 
workforce, but it also exacerbated the DOL’s already difficult task of building trust 
with unauthorized workers. Indeed, as a general matter, the DOL has sought to 
distance itself from ICE for fear that it would be mistaken for sharing the same 
                                                                                                            
  51. DECKER ET AL., supra note 45, at 4. Generally speaking, it is not uncommon 
for different groups to be informed by different networks of information. In a recent work, 
Russell Robinson makes just such claims in developing his theory of perceptual 
segregation—i.e., the phenomenon that blacks and whites can witness the same personal 
interaction, but come away with entirely different conclusions as to that interaction’s racial 
implications. See Russell K. Robinson, Perceptual Segregation, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 
1120–22 (2008). He explains that blacks and whites not uncommonly develop notions and 
theories on race in different environments. Id. In describing a world in which blacks and 
whites access “racialized pools of information,” id. at 1122, Robinson’s observations help 
explain why an unauthorized migrant may live in the United States for years and still exhibit 
reluctance to trust or interact with public entities.  
  52. One U.S. Government Accountability Office report estimates that nearly 
three-fourths of all DOL investigations originate with a complaint. See U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-962T, FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT: BETTER USE OF 
AVAILABLE RESOURCES AND CONSISTENT REPORTING COULD IMPROVE COMPLIANCE 7 
(2008), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08962t.pdf. 
  53. See Lee, supra note 12, at 1120–23. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1974624
2011] MONITORING IMMIGRATION 1105 
interests as immigration enforcement agencies.54 Without the benefit of workers 
calling in complaints, identifying specific bad-actor employers becomes all the 
more difficult, leaving the DOL with blunter investigatory instruments, such as 
random audits. Given the imperfect nature of the information flowing through 
immigrant communities, unauthorized migrants are just as likely to see these sorts 
of interagency collaborations as adverse to their interests rather than for what they 
really are.55 These stories punctuate the point that, in many cases, an unauthorized 
immigrant need not have actually had a negative interaction with public entities to 
develop a distrust of them. Even second-hand experiences, those that come to the 
employee via organizational networks, can have the effect of pushing unauthorized 
immigrants deeper into the margins of society.56 
C. The Shortcomings of Traditional Fixes 
In theory, the regulation of workplaces should be a joint endeavor with 
input from both immigration enforcement and labor enforcement agencies. In 
practice, however, such an arrangement has been hard to realize. Here, I explain 
why two traditional fixes—executive monitoring and agency splitting—provide 
incomplete solutions to the challenges of interagency coordination. 
                                                                                                            
  54. In testimony before the House Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims, 
Richard M. Stana, Director of Justice Issues at the GAO, stated: 
Labor officials will not delve into worksite immigration matters if it 
would have a detrimental effect on Labor’s primary mission of enforcing 
worker protection laws. If employees perceived that Labor investigators 
were trying to determine their immigration status and possibly report 
those who may be unauthorized to INS, it would have a “chilling effect” 
on employees’ willingness to report workplace violations.  
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-02-861T, IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT: 
CHALLENGES TO IMPLEMENTING THE INS INTERIOR ENFORCEMENT STRATEGY 7 (2002) 
(emphasis added), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02861t.pdf. 
  55. As one labor organizer observed, “Each agency attracts their [sic] own 
audience. For example, if the DOL holds a community meeting, no one will attend. [The 
community] sees the INS as government, and synonymous with all other government 
agencies.” Shannon Gleeson, Organizing for Immigrant Labor Rights: Latino Immigrants in 
San Jose and Houston, in CIVIC HOPES AND POLITICAL REALITIES: IMMIGRANTS, 
COMMUNITY ORGANIZATIONS, AND POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT 107, 121 (S. Karthick 
Ramakrishnan & Irene Bloemraad eds., 2008) (second alteration in original). 
  56. Work on legal readings—the meaning that people attach to those legal 
structures based on their experiences and perspectives—helps clarify this point. In the 
context of workplace antidiscrimination policies, Fuller, Edelman, and Matusik explain that 
such policies are designed “to signal legitimacy” or “to send a message of compliance with 
law and some degree of fairness.” Sally Riggs Fuller et al., Legal Readings: Employee 
Interpretation and Mobilization of Law, 25 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 200, 205 (2000). If the 
signaled message of fairness deviates from the employee’s discrimination-imbued reality, 
the employee is likely to judge the employer (the legal structure) more harshly. See id. For 
this reason, state labor entities are not uncommonly seen as more trustworthy from the 
perspective of the unauthorized immigrant community. As Shannon Gleeson observes, 
“Compared to federal agencies, . . . state agencies are the preferred route because of their 
more robust protections, increased accessibility, and a lingering concern over potential 
information sharing between federal agencies and immigration authorities.” Gleeson, supra 
note 55, at 119. 
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1. Constraints on Executive Oversight  
Ordinarily, when an agency begins veering from its mission, the 
Executive can right the course through its oversight powers. But a variety of 
constraints prevent the Executive from effectively overseeing ICE workplace 
enforcement decisions.  
As a constitutional matter, the President’s primary form of oversight is his 
ability to influence the heads of agencies through the appointment power.57 
Administrative law scholars have explained that Presidents can influence agencies 
through a variety of sub-constitutional channels as well.58 But as the history of 
workplace enforcement has shown, the Executive faces real constraints when 
trying to steer enforcement strategy. 
Soon after taking office, President Obama offered some initial thoughts 
on the kind of reform he envisioned. Importantly, he acknowledged that employers 
often “us[e] illegal workers in order to drive down wages—and often times 
mistreat those workers.”59 But what was of particular interest to defenders of 
immigrant rights everywhere was what the President said next. Even while the 
nation awaited comprehensive immigration reform, President Obama assured us 
that administrative changes were afoot: “DHS is already in the process of cracking 
down on unscrupulous employers, and, in collaboration with the Department of 
Labor, working to protect those workers from exploitation.”60 The President has 
                                                                                                            
  57. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“[H]e shall nominate, and by and with the 
Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and 
Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose 
appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by 
Law . . . .”). 
  58. For example, Presidents can issue formal directives, which are “generally 
styled as memoranda to the heads of departments[] instructing one or more agencies to 
propose a rule or perform some other administrative action within a set period of time.” 
Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2285 (2001). In less 
formal ways, Presidents can nudge agency action with speeches, ceremonies, news 
conferences, and radio addresses. Id. at 2299. Kagan explains that this was particularly true 
of President Clinton: 
In event after event, speech after speech, Clinton claimed ownership of 
administrative actions, presenting them to the public as his own—as the 
product of his values and decisions. He emerged in public, and to the 
public, as the wielder of “executive authority” and, in that capacity, the 
source of regulatory action. 
Id. at 2300. Far from acting as a mere overseer of agency processes and policy choices, 
which some have argued best describes the role that the President ought to play in the 
administrative state, on Kagan’s account, Presidents have increasingly acted like and held 
themselves out as “deciders.” See Peter L. Strauss, Overseer, or “The Decider?” The 
President in Administrative Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696, 745 (2007). 
  59. President Barack Obama, Remarks After Meeting with Members of 
Congress to Discuss Immigration (June 25, 2009) (transcript available  
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-after-meeting-
with-members-of-Congress-to-discuss-immigration). 
  60. Id. It remains to be seen how long this will last. Having assumed control of 
the House of Representatives, Republicans have signaled a desire to return to targeting 
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repeatedly signaled to defenders and advocates of immigrants’ rights that his 
administration will use labor law and policy to inform immigration law and policy. 
As he envisions it, ICE and the DOL will come together and create a workplace 
enforcement regime that jointly regulates employers for “hiring and exploiting” 
unauthorized workers.61 The numbers seem to bear out the President’s vision. 
Since President Obama has taken office, the number of worksite raids has 
diminished. During fiscal year 2009, for example, the number of unauthorized 
immigrants arrested through worksite raids dropped 70%, from 5184 to 1644, 
while the number of employers who have been audited has doubled to 1444.62 But 
this shift in workplace enforcement strategy is not nearly as strident as these 
numbers suggest. Three reasons should give us pause. 
First, although President Obama’s employer-centric approach to worksite 
enforcement better comports with IRCA’s overall purpose than President Bush’s 
worker-focused approach, the total numbers of investigations are still quite modest 
in historical terms.63 Second, this renewed focus on employers must compete with 
the ongoing enforcement goal of targeting criminal noncitizens.64 Put differently, 
even as the President shifts priorities within workplace enforcement policy, such a 
shift must work against an overall congressional preference to punish criminal 
noncitizens. This is a trend that began in the years immediately following the 
                                                                                                            
workers instead of employers. See Brian Bennett, Republicans Want a Return to Workplace 
Immigration Raids, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jan/27/ 
nation/la-na-immigration-raids-20110127. 
  61. See President Barack Obama, Remarks on Comprehensive Immigration 
Reform (July 1, 2010) (transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/remarks-president-comprehensive-immigration-reform) (“That’s why businesses 
must be held accountable if they break the law by deliberately hiring and exploiting 
undocumented workers. We’ve already begun to step up enforcement against the worst 
workplace offenders.” (emphasis added)); see also U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS 
ENFORCEMENT, ICE STRATEGIC PLAN FY 2010–2014, at 6 (2010), available  
at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/news/library/reports/strategic-plan/strategic-plan-2010.pdf 
(“[E]nforcing the immigration-related employment laws is a critical component of border 
security. . . . Criminal investigations will increasingly focus on employers who abuse and 
exploit workers or otherwise engage in egregious conduct.” (emphasis added)). 
  62. See N.C. Aizenman, Latinos Increasingly Critical of Obama’s Record on 
Immigration, WASH. POST, Mar. 20, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/ 
article/2010/03/19/AR2010031904676.html. 
  63. Testifying before Congress in October 2011, Deputy Director John Morton 
indicated that ICE had already investigated over 3000 workplaces. See U.S. Immigration 
and Customs Enforcement: Priorities and the Rule of Law: Hearing Before the Subcomm. 
on Immigration Policy and Enforcement of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 5 
(2011) (statement of John Morton, Director, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement). 
By contrast, in 1990, the INS investigated nearly 10,000 employers. See Peter Brownell, 
The Declining Enforcement of Employer Sanctions, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (Sept. 2005), 
http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/display.cfm?id=332.  
  64. Recent enforcement guidelines issued by DHS “reflect[] a renewed 
Department-wide focus targeting criminal aliens and employers who cultivate illegal 
workplaces by breaking the country’s laws and knowingly hiring illegal workers.” Press 
Release, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Fact Sheet: Worksite Enforcement Strategy (Apr. 
30, 2009), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/news/library/factsheets/pdf/worksite-
strategy.pdf. 
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passage of IRCA. Although the INS had a fresh mandate to target employers, with 
an increasing national focus on criminal immigrant offenders, and the relative ease 
with which those offenders could be identified and deported, the INS found itself 
in a position to obtain supplemental funding to pursue those immigrants tied up in 
drug trafficking. In 1988, just two years after the passage of IRCA, the INS 
received $52.4 million to bolster its officer core and buy equipment to monitor the 
border.65 In 1989, the INS received another $16.9 million, also to be used toward 
drug enforcement—an amount that comprised 84% of the increase in 
congressional appropriations received by the INS that year.66  
Third and finally, it is almost certainly the case that shifting workplace 
enforcement in a more labor-centric direction will require more than the occasional 
directive. The growing anecdotal evidence paints a picture of immigration agency 
officials resisting anything other than heavy-handed law enforcement tactics.67 In 
other words, even as Presidents and high-ranking administration officials change, 
agencies and their bureaucrats largely stay the same. In the dawning weeks of the 
Obama administration, ICE officers raided Yamato Engine Specialists in 
Bellingham, Washington without notifying DHS’s central office.68 ICE had 
previously arrested an unauthorized immigrant with a criminal history who had 
worked at Yamato, which led to an investigation and the eventual raid. That same 
day, ICE issued a press release touting this raid as a part of ICE’s “dramatically 
enhanced . . . efforts to combat the unlawful employment of illegal aliens in the 
United States.”69 Although DHS Secretary Napolitano eventually ordered a review 
of that incident, and of immigration enforcement guidelines generally, the 
                                                                                                            
  65. See Jason Juffras, IRCA and the Enforcement Mission of the Immigration 
and Naturalization Service, in THE PAPER CURTAIN, supra note 3, at 33, 49. 
  66. Id. Today, federal immigration crimes comprise more than half of the federal 
criminal docket. See Ingrid V. Eagly, Prosecuting Immigration, 104 NW. L. REV. 1281, 
1281–82 (2010). 
  67. This conclusion becomes even firmer when considering the historical 
ambivalence toward labor consequences evinced by ICE’s predecessor agency, the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service. See CALAVITA, supra note 8, at 131–36. 
  68. In a similar act of defiance, during the early days of the Obama 
administration, a district director in the state of Washington ordered a raid of a 
manufacturing plant and issued a press release touting this act, despite the President’s shift 
in workplace enforcement policy. See Manuel Valdes, Napolitano Orders Review 
of Bellingham Immigration Raid, SEATTLE TIMES, Feb. 25, 2009, 
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/2008785918_webraid25m.html. Upset by 
this administration’s approach to immigration enforcement, the union representing ICE 
agents cast a unanimous “vote of no confidence” and demanded the resignation of ICE’s 
director, John Morton. Jerry Seper, Agents’ Union Disavows Leaders of ICE; Sees Support 
for “Amnesty,” WASH. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2010, at 1; see also Jerry Markon, Calls For His 
Resignation ‘Just Part of the Territory,’ Says ICE Director Morton, WASH. POST, July 19, 
2010, at A13; Press Release, Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps., Nat’l Council 118 – Immigration 
and Customs Enforcement, Vote of No Confidence in ICE Director John Morton and ICE 
ODPP Assistant Director Phyllis Coven (June 25, 2010), available at 
http://www.cis.org/articles/2010/259-259-vote-no-confidence.pdf. 
  69. Press Release, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 28 Illegal 
Workers at Bellingham Company Arrested in ICE Operation (Feb. 24, 2009), 
http://www.ice.gov/news/releases/0902/090224bellingham.htm. 
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Bellingham example highlights how agencies—in the absence of costly oversight 
and top-down executive directives—will pursue “low-hanging fruit.”70 
Questions of implementation have persisted throughout President 
Obama’s tenure in office. As Congress continues to suffer from legislative 
gridlock, the President has tried to achieve through administrative channels what 
Congress refuses to correct through statutory reform. For example, in August 
2011, the President announced that DHS would review removal cases involving 
noncitizens without criminal records71 and high-achieving, undocumented youth 
on a case-by-case basis.72 Importantly, those noncitizens who receive the benefit of 
this exercise of discretion become eligible for work authorization.73 While this 
policy shift sends a friendly signal to the President’s constituents—immigrants’ 
rights activists and sympathizers—the results of implementation have thus far been 
mixed. Predictably, implementation efforts have been slowed by skepticism, 
resentment, and resistance within ICE’s low-level workforce. A recent account 
suggests that agents have found the guidelines to be unwieldy and at odds with 
what they see as the fundamental purpose of immigration law—namely the 
detention and removal of noncitizens.74 As a result, those noncitizens who have 
gathered community support and garnered media attention seem to be faring well 
under the policy shift,75 whereas the more anonymous members of the 
                                                                                                            
  70. Ginger Thompson, Immigration Agents to Turn Their Focus to Employers, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2009, at A19; see also Valdes, supra note 68. ICE ultimately secured 
convictions against some of the corporate directors of Yamato Engine Specialists. See Press 
Release, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Directors of Washington Company 
Plead Guilty to Felony Immigration Violations: Pair Admits They Allowed Submission of 
False Immigration Forms for Employees (Aug. 18, 2009), http://www.ice.gov/news/
releases/0908/090818seattle.htm.  
  71. See Frequently Asked Questions on the Administration’s Announcement 
Regarding a New Process to Further Focus Immigration Enforcement Resources on High 
Priority Cases, U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.gov/doclib/
about/offices/ero/pdf/immigration-enforcement-facts.pdf (last visited Sept. 12, 2011) 
[hereinafter FAQ on High Priority Cases]. 
  72.  In this regard, the policy is a response to Congress’s failure to pass the 
DREAM Act, a bill that would allow high-achieving, undocumented college students and 
graduates to adjust their status. See Robert Pear, Fewer Youths to Be Deported in New 
Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2011, at A1. 
  73.  See FAQ on High Priority Cases, supra note 71, at 2 (noting that while work 
authorization is not automatic, “[p]er longstanding federal law, individuals affected by an 
exercise of prosecutorial discretion will be able to request work authorization”). 
  74.  The president of the American Federation of Government Employees, the 
union that represents ICE agents, has insisted that the guidelines “cannot be effectively 
applied in the field” and are objectionable because they “take away officers’ discretion and 
establish a system that mandates that the nation’s most fundamental immigration laws are 
not enforced.” Julia Preston, Obama Policy On Deporting Used Unevenly, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 13, 2011, at A16. As one immigrant rights advocate observes, “This is a classic 
example of leadership saying one thing and the rank and file doing another.” Id. 
  75.  For example, Manual Guerra, who has been fighting removal for the past 
five years, was one of the first to benefit from the shift. See Julia Preston, U.S. Issues New 
Deportation Policy’s First Reprieves, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 2011, at A15. Guerra is also a 
high-achieving student, who has benefitted from the support of the wider “DREAMer” 
community. See Gabriela Garcia, Great News! Dream Leader Manuel Guerra Will Stay in 
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undocumented community remain at the mercy of individual officials in field 
offices.76 Presidential oversight, therefore, provides a costly and incomplete 
mechanism for harmonizing the immigration and labor enforcement goals that 
arise in the workplace.  
2. The Limits of Agency Splitting 
Another prevalent mechanism for policing incompliant agencies is agency 
splitting. Where an agency has difficulties reconciling multiple enforcement 
responsibilities, splitting relieves the agency of the responsibility that most directly 
conflicts with the agency’s primary mission orientation. This administrative fix 
resolves the problem of conflict and tension by transferring enforcement 
responsibilities to an agency that is unburdened by the conflict of interests. Most 
people associate agency splitting with the federal government’s response to the 
2010 BP oil spill,77 but such an administrative fix is actually quite familiar to 
students and scholars of immigration law.  
The history of immigration enforcement is filled with agency splitting and 
reorganization. In 1913, Congress abolished the Bureau of Immigration and 
Naturalization and transferred its authority to two newly created administrative 
entities: the Bureau of Immigration and the Bureau of Naturalization.78 As the 
nature of the subdivision would indicate, the Immigration Bureau was relieved of 
any responsibility over those matters concerning the naturalization of noncitizens. 
In response to this reorganization, the head of the newly created Immigration 
Bureau commented that because the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization 
“never took an active part in the enforcement of [naturalization] laws . . . the 
provision of law constituting the division of separate bureau is welcomed as a wise 
adjustment of the public business.”79 In 1933, U.S. immigration agencies 
underwent another significant reorganization. Twenty years after the Bureau of 
Immigration and Naturalization was divided into two separate agencies—one 
addressing immigration enforcement and the other overseeing naturalization—the 
two agencies were reconsolidated to form the INS.80  
                                                                                                            
the US, Says Attorney, CHANGE.ORG (Aug. 23, 2011), http://news.change.org/stories/great-
news-dream-leader-manuel-guerra-will-stay-in-the-us-says-attorney. 
  76. See Susan Carroll, New Immigration Policy Too Late for Sick Teacher: Man 
Deported to Spain Despite Clean Record, Job, HOUS. CHRON., Aug. 27, 2011, at 1. 
  77. As a part of its responsibilities, the Minerals Management Service (“MMS”) 
was empowered to oversee both the revenue-collection process for oil rigs and the 
enforcement of safety and environmental laws against those same rigs, goals that for 
obvious reasons tend to conflict. In response to the spill, the federal government split apart 
the MMS. John M. Broder, U.S. to Split Up Agency Policing the Oil Industry, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 12, 2010, at A1. 
  78. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 96TH CONG., HISTORY OF THE IMMIGRATION AND 
NATURALIZATION SERVICE 19 (Comm. Print 1980) [hereinafter HISTORY OF THE INS].  
  79. See id. at 19–20. 
  80. See Exec. Order No. 6166 (June 10, 1933), available at 
http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/codification/executive-order/06166.html. While it 
is not entirely clear why our immigration agencies were reorganized, a few reasons can be 
inferred. For one thing, it apparently saved costs by evincing sensitivity to the growing 
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In the INS, the public found a sense of continuity as that agency came to 
regulate most of the major immigration-related activities. For 70 unbroken years, 
even as structural changes occurred at the margins81 and as statutory law was 
revised and perfected, the same agency absorbed mandates, chased regulatory 
benchmarks, developed a mission orientation, and negotiated a work culture all its 
own. In 2002, the INS was dissolved under the Homeland Security Act.82 
Importantly, its dissolution was in part a response to the critique that an agency 
that fulfilled both “enforcement” and “services” functions could not manage either 
effectively.83 By separating out these functions, Congress signaled in unambiguous 
terms that the primary purpose of the newly created ICE was the enforcement of 
immigration laws against noncitizens.84 The reorganization ushered in by the 
                                                                                                            
wariness of governmental waste. See HISTORY OF THE INS, supra note 78, at 41 (“When INS 
was created, the annual budget of the two previously existing services was reduced by about 
$1,500,000, necessitating a reduction in the workforce.”). For another, it seemed like a 
response to the growing concern over the administrative challenges of naturalization. See id. 
(noting that the reorganization “followed several years of concern by the Bureau of 
Immigration that naturalization standards should be tightened”).  
  81. In 1940, Congress transferred the INS into the Department of Justice and 
although the transfer left the INS intact, it marked a shift in thinking. See Reorganization 
Act of 1939, Pub. L. No. 76-19, 53 Stat. 561. Although the regulatory challenges arising 
from immigration were long conceived primarily in terms of work and labor, empowering 
the DOJ to manage the INS (and its resources) signaled very clearly that immigration posed 
an additional set of challenges associated with global conflict and national security. Beyond 
worrying about whether immigrant workers were driving down wages for U.S. citizen 
workers, the INS also faced the challenge of screening for and excluding, or detecting and 
deporting, any foreign elements that might surreptitiously cross U.S. borders to threaten the 
nation. 
  82. Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 471, 116 Stat. 2135, 
2205 (codified as amended at 6 U.S.C. § 291 (2006)). 
  83. See Eric Schmitt, Vote in House Strongly Backs an End to I.N.S., N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 26, 2002, at A1. The INS was empowered to serve two distinct sets of 
functions—one involving what might be loosely characterized as an “enforcement” function 
and another pertaining to a “services” function. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 
abolished the agency and reallocated authority along these lines. See 6 U.S.C. § 291(a) 
(2006) (abolishing the INS); id. § 542 (requiring the President to submit a reorganization 
plan regarding the agencies affected by the Act). Importantly, the Act prohibited the 
President from combining, joining, or consolidating the functions of the newly created 
Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) and Bureau of Border Security, 
the latter of which eventually became the U.S. Customs and Border Protection agency. See 
id. § 291(b). Our immigration system as currently designed, then, segregates enforcement 
and services functions so that ICE serves the former function and USCIS fulfills the latter.  
  84. After the passage of the House Bill approving the passage of the INS, then-
Attorney General John Ashcroft remarked, “It is time to separate fully our services to legal 
immigrants, who helped build America, from our enforcement against illegal aliens, who 
violate the law.” Schmitt, supra note 83. Post-reorganization, ICE’s orientation surely 
reflects this initial sentiment: “As the largest investigative arm of the [DHS, ICE] 
aggressively uses critical immigration and customs authorities to protect the American 
people from the illegal introduction of goods and the entry of terrorists and other criminals 
seeking to cross our Nation’s borders.” U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., BUDGET-IN-BRIEF: 
FISCAL YEAR 2010, at 63 (2009), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/ 
budget_bib_fy2010.pdf. It is worth pointing out that the enforcement–services distinction is 
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Homeland Security Act was, therefore, a rejection of an immigration system where 
an agency’s multiple goals threatened to undermine the effective pursuit of either 
goal. 
Against this history of reorganization, why not attempt a similar 
reorganization in the context of workplace enforcement? Why not simply transfer 
IRCA enforcement responsibility from ICE to the DOL? Some reform-minded 
individuals have floated this exact idea.85 But in the context of workplace 
enforcement, employing this fairly typical administrative fix would lead to the 
counterintuitive result of likely weakening labor protections for unauthorized 
migrants. An administrative experiment explored during the Clinton administration 
suggests that this would almost certainly be the case. From 1992 to 1998, the INS 
and the DOL coordinated their worksite enforcement efforts in such a way that 
required the DOL to review employer records for immigration violations whenever 
                                                                                                            
a loose one because there are inevitably some cases that defy easy characterization. See 
David A. Martin, Immigration Policy and the Homeland Security Act Reorganization: An 
Early Agenda for Practical Improvements, 80 INTERPRETER RELEASES 601, 602 (2003) 
(“[S]ome functions, particularly inspections at the ports of entry (which can include 
attention to asylum claims), are not easily pigeonholed as either service or enforcement.”). 
As one commission on immigration reform observed:  
[P]lacing incompatible service and enforcement functions within one 
agency creates problems: competition for resources; lack of coordination 
and cooperation; and personnel practices that both encourage transfer 
between enforcement and service positions and create confusion 
regarding mission and responsibilities. Combining responsibility for 
enforcement and benefits also blurs the distinction between illegal 
migration and legal admissions. 
Alternative Proposals to Restructure the Immigration and Naturalization Service: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Immigration and Claims of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th 
Cong. 109–10 (1998) (statement of Susan Martin, Former Director, U.S. Commission on 
Immigration Reform); see also Martin, supra, at 602 (“Extensive reorganization of the INS 
has been debated and planned for since at least 1998. Virtually all plans called for some 
kind of split between immigration enforcement functions and immigration service 
functions.” (citations omitted)). 
  85. Peter Brownell has argued that empowering the DOL to play a “larger 
enforcement role” in formulating immigration-related workplace enforcement policies 
would improve workplace enforcement:  
[B]ecause DOL has no mandate to enforce immigration laws directed 
against aliens, there would be no temptation to shift a greater share of 
enforcement resources toward that disenfranchised group. Rather, DOL 
has understood for some time that the effective enforcement of labor law 
requires that immigrants feel safe in calling to complain about labor 
standards violations. 
Brownell, supra note 63. Robert Bach and Doris Meissner have made a similar suggestion. 
Bach & Meissner, supra note 3, at 299 (“The government’s modest level of resources for 
sanctions could be leveraged more effectively if DOL inspectors had enforcement authority 
similar to that of the INS.”). Meissner, of course, went on to become the INS commissioner 
in the Clinton administration. 
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it investigated worksites for wage and hour violations.86 By engaging in the direct 
enforcement of immigration laws against individual employers, the DOL 
unwittingly undermined its ability to enforce labor laws against employers more 
generally.87 Therefore, empowering the DOL would be an improvement in 
workplace enforcement to the extent that such an arrangement would better align 
enforcement goals with mission orientation. Unlike ICE, the DOL has a long 
history of regulating employers, so there would be no fear of agency shirking. But 
transferring enforcement authority to the DOL would solve one problem while 
creating another. Expanding the DOL’s enforcement authority would deter many 
unauthorized migrants from reporting labor violations given that they would face 
an unattractive menu of options: They can either continue to suffer labor violations 
or report their employers to the DOL for these labor violations, which under this 
arrangement would also invite scrutiny of the employer’s compliance with 
immigration law. Therefore, expanding the DOL’s ability to directly regulate 
employers for immigration violations—which agency splitting would do—solves 
the shirking problem, but only at the cost of deterring unauthorized workers from 
reporting labor violations committed by their employers.88 
II. INTERAGENCY MONITORING 
In the context of workplace enforcement, here is the central dilemma: 
Although ICE is empowered to regulate employers in a manner that accommodates 
labor goals, it tends to ignore these goals. Meanwhile, although the DOL enjoys 
joint regulatory power in theory, the allocation of enforcement authority is 
asymmetric in practice. Executive oversight can be costly, and agency splitting 
proves to be not much of a solution at all. Giving the DOL direct immigration 
enforcement authority would solve the agency-shirking problem, but only at the 
risk of chilling the reporting of labor violations, which on balance would probably 
weaken labor protections for unauthorized migrants. 
But what if the DOL were given indirect enforcement authority? What if 
workplace enforcement authority remained with ICE, but the DOL and other labor 
agencies were empowered to monitor ICE’s enforcement decisions, thus indirectly 
                                                                                                            
  86. See Memorandum of Understanding Between the Immigration and 
Naturalization Serv., Dep’t of Justice, and the Employment Standards Admin., Dep’t of 
Labor (June 11, 1992), reprinted in 113 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) D-1. 
  87. See Michael J. Wishnie, Immigrant Workers and the Domestic Enforcement 
of International Labor Rights, 4 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 529, 547–48 (2002). 
  88. Since 1998, the DOL has been prohibited from examining an employer’s 
hiring records where the investigation arose from a complaint of labor violations. See 
Memorandum of Understanding Between the Immigration and Naturalization Serv., Dep’t 
of Justice, and the Employment Standards Admin., Dep’t of Labor (Nov. 23, 1998) 
[hereinafter 1998 MOU], available at http://www.nilc.org/immsemplymnt/emprights/ 
MOU.pdf. This information firewall helps insulate against the perception that labor agencies 
share with immigration agencies the sensitive immigration-related information of workers. 
See Philip Martin & Mark Miller, Employer Sanctions: French, German and U.S. 
Experiences 34–35 (Int’l Migration Branch of Int’l Labour Office, Working Paper No. 36, 
2000) (noting that during the 1990s, “the Department of Labor provided few tips to the INS 
because it feared that workers would be afraid to cooperate in wage and other labour law 
investigations”).   
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affecting the outcome? Over the years, a body of literature has emerged where 
scholars have grappled with questions of interagency coordination and have 
focused on whether tinkering with agency arrangements can affect how any one 
agency makes decisions.89 This scholarship is useful for helping to solve the 
quandary presented by workplace enforcement. These scholars have framed the 
problem as follows: Because agencies are saddled with multiple and often 
conflicting goals, in some instances, empowering agencies (i.e., monitoring 
agencies) to monitor the decisions of other agencies (i.e., lead agencies) can help 
deter these lead agencies from pursuing certain enforcement or regulatory goals at 
the expense of others. Environmental law scholars have been particularly sensitive 
to this dynamic given that many pro-energy agencies, like the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (“FERC”), would almost certainly make decisions that 
furthered energy goals at the expense of environmental ones if left to their own 
devices.90 This theory tends to build on two interrelated observations: First, that 
principals (like the Executive, Congress, and courts) have had mixed success in 
influencing the actions taken by subordinate agencies;91 and second, that the 
conflicting goals are so interrelated that transferring one goal to another agency is 
rendered impracticable.92 Against this background, these scholars have argued that 
agencies can fill this oversight gap. J.R. DeShazo and Jody Freeman have 
demonstrated that enabling pro-environment federal and state agencies to serve an 
ex ante monitoring function has forced FERC to consider environmental goals that 
they would have otherwise ignored or of which they would have been ignorant.93 
In this example, the monitoring agencies remind FERC of its environmental 
obligations, thus preventing it from claiming ignorance and, at the very least, 
forcing FERC to justify its actions.94  
                                                                                                            
  89. See, e.g., Jacob E. Gersen, Overlapping and Underlapping Jurisdiction in 
Administrative Law, 2006 SUP. CT. REV. 201; Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Architecture of 
Smart Intelligence: Structuring and Overseeing Agencies in the Post-9/11 World, 94 CALIF. 
L. REV. 1655 (2006); Daniel Richman, Prosecutors and Their Agents, Agents and Their 
Prosecutors, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 749 (2003).  
  90. See J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, Public Agencies as Lobbyists, 105 
COLUM. L. REV. 2217, 2239–41 (2005) (describing how the FERC resisted or was blind to 
the environmental effects of their decisions on account of agency culture and expertise).  
  91. See Eric Biber, Too Many Things to Do: How to Deal with the Dysfunctions 
of Multiple-Goal Agencies, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 9 (2009) (“Economists and political 
scientists have developed an extensive literature examining the problems of principal–agent 
interactions, with specific applications for governmental and non-profit organizations. That 
literature provides us with some important insights into the nature and logic of how 
agencies tasked with multiple goals are likely to function.”); see also DeShazo & Freeman, 
supra note 90, at 2241–52 (discussing the ways in which congressional, executive, and 
judicial oversight have proven to be ineffective in ensuring that FERC take into account the 
environmental consequences of its actions).  
  92. See Biber, supra note 91, at 33–34 (describing the difficulty of separating 
interconnected and interrelated goals). 
  93. See DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 90, at 2222–28. 
  94. See id. at 2272–80 (presenting empirical evidence that the passage of the 
Electric Consumers Protection Act, which required FERC to consult certain pro-
environment agencies, affected FERC’s compliance with its environmental obligations). 
Eric Biber has pointed to examples where monitoring agencies wield more than hortatory 
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Interagency monitoring, therefore, sets out to solve a particular type of 
problem: Although Congress has empowered an agency to enforce a particular 
mandate, that agency has ignored or otherwise shirked its duty to enforce that 
mandate. A system of lateral oversight can help solve the shirking problem where 
vertical oversight has proven to be ineffective (for whatever reason) and where the 
mandate presents a mismatch with the agency’s primary mission orientation. If 
agencies, over time, tend to evade their secondary obligations, one solution is to 
empower other agencies to act as monitors. Within the interagency monitoring 
framework, oversight responsibilities are assumed by an agency “that has a 
different mission . . . that . . . will not interfere with, and may even promote, 
innovation in the measurement of the ‘secondary’ goal.”95 As scholars have 
pointed out, lateral monitoring schemes have appeared throughout the 
administrative state and across decisionmaking schemes. In some cases, agencies 
monitor relatively open licensing processes,96 while in other instances, agencies 
are charged with monitoring the traditionally more cloistered process of 
enforcement.97 The relative ubiquity of such schemes highlights the importance of 
understanding how agencies interact with one another, and not just with the 
political branches, courts, and the public. 
In assessing an agency’s primary mission orientation, proponents of the 
interagency monitoring framework in other contexts have tended to focus on a few 
sources of information and agency characteristics. First, an agency’s enabling act 
offers a natural starting point given that it provides the statutory justification for, 
and structural blueprints to, an agency’s existence. It is particularly useful when 
examining it both within the context of the historical circumstances leading up to 
an enabling act’s passage and against subsequent acts imposing additional duties 
onto the agency.98 Because agencies absorb additional responsibilities over time, 
                                                                                                            
authority. In some instances, agencies have been subject to lawsuits for failing to comply 
with certain mandates. See Biber, supra note 91, at 45–57. 
  95. Biber, supra note 91, at 41. DeShazo and Freeman go a bit further and 
recommend giving monitoring duties to agencies whose mandates not only do not conflict 
with the decisionmaking agency’s secondary goal, but “which derive relevant expertise and 
interests from their own statutory mandates, to lobby the implementing agency.” DeShazo 
& Freeman, supra note 90, at 2221. 
  96. DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 90, at 2267–70. 
  97. For example, the EPA and the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) are 
both empowered to regulate pesticides in food. By statute, the EPA is empowered to set the 
tolerable limits of “pesticide chemical residue,” 21 U.S.C. § 342(a)(2)(B) (2006), while the 
FDA is empowered by regulation to recall or seize food, or impose penalties, where food 
contains such residue beyond tolerable limits, see 21 C.F.R. § 7.1 (2011). See also Keith 
Bradley, The Design of Agency Interactions, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 745, 750–51 (2011) 
(describing this joint regulatory scheme). 
  98. For example, in explaining the modern quandary that FERC faces, DeShazo 
and Freeman tell a story that begins with FERC’s predecessor agency, the Federal Power 
Commission (“FPC”). Created by Congress in 1920—a time well before the emergence of 
the environmental movement—“[t]he FPC’s original statutory mission was unmistakably 
propower.” DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 90, at 2236. Although much of the public 
today expects—and many environmental protection statutes require—those agencies to 
consider the harmful environmental impact of their decisions, this was not the case for much 
of those agencies’ histories. Well before the advent of the environmental protection 
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an agency’s mission orientation can change in response to shifting political winds 
and acts taken by subsequent Congresses. Assessing an agency’s bureaucratic 
culture can also help fill in important details. Understanding how agencies and 
their officials understand themselves—and how they perceive other agencies and 
their officials—helps establish whether an agency exhibits preferences for certain 
types of enforcement goals over others.99 Finally, an agency’s mission orientation 
is often tied to the scope of its expertise. The FERC example is again instructive. 
For several decades in the middle of the 20th century, the FERC maintained an 
entire division of field personnel who were all professional engineers. By contrast, 
during this same period, the FERC contained no division devoted to fisheries or 
recreational interests that could weigh in on the environmental considerations 
associated with a particular licensing proposal.100 In this sense, expertise captures 
an agency’s capacity, as opposed to willingness, to take on and effectively 
implement additional duties. 
A mismatch occurs when a particular enforcement goal contradicts or 
stands in tension with an agency’s mission orientation.101 The mismatch problem 
presents a reality where “there are multiple sets of interests that a policy cannot 
trade off against each other in a predictable way.”102 The nature of the enforcement 
goals, and more importantly, the metrics used to measure the successful 
implementation of those goals, can exacerbate this phenomenon. Eric Biber 
suggests that over time, in the context of land management, enforcement 
distortions will emerge that favor producing timber because the quantifiable nature 
                                                                                                            
moment, it is clear that the FPC approached hydropower licensing decisions with a 
distinctly propower bent. As DeShazo and Freeman observe, the FPC sought to “develop[] 
hydropower to meet the needs of a growing economy,” and as history has shown, the 
majority of licenses the FPC ultimately approved occurred during this period. Id. at 2237–
38; see also Biber, supra note 91, at 17–18 (explaining that the U.S. Forest Service was 
created at the turn of the 20th century primarily to engage in timber production, which is an 
objective that stands in tension with modern environmental goals of accounting for how 
timber production decisions might adversely impact diversity of wildlife and plant species, 
facilitate soil erosion, and taint scenery). 
  99. See Richman, supra note 89, at 786–93 (describing the career trajectories 
taken by federal investigative agents and federal prosecutors, the different acculturation 
processes involved in each, and how this difference can lead to culture clashes).  
100. DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 90, at 2239. Creating no capacity to 
generate or absorb the insights regarding the environmental consequences of licensing 
decisions enabled the FERC to disregard this ambiguous set of duties in favor of pursuing a 
propower agenda.  
101. One of criticisms levied against the FBI in the wake of 9/11 was the FBI’s 
failure to gather intelligence. But the FBI’s culture was much more primed to serve a 
traditional law enforcement function than it was to carry out an intelligence-gathering 
mission, and indeed, as an agency, it was predisposed to taking a less-than-robust approach 
to intelligence gathering. During the 1970s, abuses of civil liberties by the FBI had surfaced 
and as a result, it began steering clear of domestic intelligence activities. See Luis Garicano 
& Richard A. Posner, Intelligence Failures: An Organizational Economics Perspective, 19 
J. ECON. PERSP. 151, 163–64 (2005).  
102. Bradley, supra note 97, at 773. 
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of clear-cutting better lends itself to demonstrating agency success.103 Producing 
timber generates a clear, unambiguous, and easily quantifiable outcome. By 
contrast, whether or not a particular parcel of land has retained its aesthetic beauty 
is an issue that can be resolved only through a subjective assessment relying on 
largely qualitative factors.104  
The methods of interagency monitoring vary. Some are hortatory. Others 
subject the lead agency to the possibility of some greater set of consequences 
ranging from political embarrassment105 to court-enforceable affirmative 
obligations.106 But all interagency collaborations have the potential to create 
uncomfortable moments, which is a part of the point. Forcing agencies to work 
together pushes lifelong bureaucrats to confront their blind spots and biases and 
often demands that they justify an action that they would otherwise never think to 
explain.107 These relationships can have a stop-and-think effect on agency officials 
and, over the long term, improve outcomes by introducing new perspectives, 
which can help fight groupthink and mitigate the possibility of capture.108  
Of course, interagency collaborations are not always antagonistic and can 
evolve over time. What begins as an “unnatural act” can eventually establish a new 
“natural.”109 Even while highlighting the cultural chasm that separates 
investigative agents from prosecutors, Daniel Richman cautions against 
“underestimat[ing] the unifying influence of a shared commitment to ‘getting the 
bad guys,’ hardened by the adversarial process, nurtured by mutual respect and 
                                                                                                            
103. See Biber, supra note 91, at 25–27 (suggesting that the “readily quantifiable” 
task of overseeing timber harvests and the largely subjective task of preserving “scenic and 
aesthetic qualities” of affected lands interacted in a way that created a structural 
environment that increased the attractiveness of timber production). 
104. See Biber, supra note 91, at 12–13. Luis Garicano and Richard Posner make 
a similar argument in the context of combating terrorism. Garicano & Posner, supra note 
101, at 164 (noting that the FBI’s investigative success has traditionally been measured in 
terms of arrests and convictions, which matches up poorly with the enterprise of intelligence 
gathering given that success in that context involves detecting plots before such activity 
reaches the level of a prosecutable crime). The diminished capacity for oversight is often 
one of the trade-offs involved in disaggregating enforcement authority. While such a design 
handicaps a principal’s powers of oversight, it often creates a competitive environment 
among agents, which creates incentives for the agents to produce better outcomes while 
deepening and broadening their expertise. See Gersen, supra note 89, at 214–15 (arguing 
that judicial deference is one reward that might be offered to agencies in exchange for 
developing expertise in certain regulatory areas). 
105. See DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 90, at 2235–36 (identifying political 
embarrassment as one consequence of an agency failing to fulfill a statutory mandate). 
106. See Biber, supra note 91, at 52–57. 
107. See EUGENE BARDACH, GETTING AGENCIES TO WORK TOGETHER: THE 
PRACTICE AND THEORY OF MANAGERIAL CRAFTSMANSHIP 232 (1998). 
108. See O’Connell, supra note 89, at 1675–78 (discussing the potential benefits 
of having multiple agencies pursuing the same regulatory goal). 
109. Eugene Bardach explains, “Interagency collaboration, the joke goes, is an 
unnatural act committed by non-consenting adults. Learning how to do it takes time and a 
willingness to make the effort—even a willingness to understand that a problem exists for 
which time and effort are required.” BARDACH, supra note 107, at 263. 
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need, and on occasion lubricated by alcohol.”110 Ultimately, this highlights the 
malleable and context-specific nature of conflict in the interagency context. 
Although shared moral commitments and off-duty revelry may be enough to 
overcome the differences separating federal prosecutors and investigative agents, 
in other contexts more structured interactions may be needed in order to foster a 
genuine culture change. 
III. MONITORING WORKPLACE ENFORCEMENT DECISIONS 
So far, I have endeavored to show that (1) workplace enforcement power 
is distributed asymmetrically between immigration and labor agencies, in 
significant part of because informational challenges; (2) the most obvious 
administrative solutions are not viable options; and (3) similar regulatory problems 
in other contexts have been dealt with through interagency arrangements where 
one agency monitors the decisions of the lead agency. In this Part, I begin to make 
the case that similar arrangements can help solve the asymmetry endemic to 
workplace enforcement. I want to suggest that regulating the type of information 
ICE relies on can help minimize the likelihood that immigration law will be co-
opted to displace labor law. I make this normative move with some level of 
trepidation. In particular, I am sensitive to the fact that there is still much to be 
learned in terms of how the DOL actually interacts with ICE and other 
immigration enforcement agencies.111  
At the same time, what we do know about the labor conditions 
experienced by unauthorized workers and about the types of worksites that are 
investigated for the presence of unauthorized workers112 strongly suggests that ICE 
officials would not have considered investigating a particular worksite but for the 
receipt of a tip or a lead. Moreover, President Obama’s shift in workplace 
enforcement—choosing, in principle, to harmonize immigration and labor law, 
instead of using the former to displace the latter—and the fading possibility of 
comprehensive immigration reform make it worthwhile to have the normative 
discussion to inform reform-minded individuals in a position to make prescriptive 
changes.  
A. Mission Mismatch  
In the context of workplace enforcement, the reality has been that ICE 
possesses a fair amount of autonomy in deciding how to implement this interior 
enforcement strategy. This has been true since at least the middle of the 20th 
                                                                                                            
110. Richman, supra note 89, at 792. 
111. The most comprehensive examination of interagency coordination in the 
context of the immigration enforcement in the workplace is Kitty Calavita’s excellent work 
on the Bracero guestworker program, which was administered 50 years ago. See CALAVITA, 
supra note 8. Any modern insights we could extrapolate from Calavita’s fine study would 
be limited by both the sheer antiquity of that interagency experiment and the fact that the 
INS has since been dissolved and replaced by DHS.  
112. See Lee, supra note 12, at 1120–23. 
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century, when the INS and the DOL (along with the Departments of State and 
Agriculture) jointly administered the Bracero guestworker program.113 
Kitty Calavita’s Inside the State: The Bracero Program, Immigration, 
and the I.N.S. provides perhaps the most detailed examination of the INS’s inner 
workings, and in particular, how it “wrangled” with other agencies like the DOL 
over enforcement policies.114 Calavita traces out the different fault lines cutting 
through our immigration system during the 1950s and 1960s. As she explains, the 
INS faced 
a bureaucratic dilemma related to its unenviable mandate to control 
illegal immigration despite the powerful economic forces driving 
that migration. Securing growers’ cooperation in using braceros 
rather than illegal workers—cooperation that was contingent on the 
INS providing growers with “a seemingly endless army of cheap, 
unorganized workers”—was the immigration agency’s response to 
this institutional dilemma.115  
Particularly illuminating was Calavita’s review of the internal memoranda 
and internal reports exchanged and compiled during the administration of the 
program. These documents revealed clashing views of immigrants and the 
overarching purpose of immigration regulation. For example, the DOL perceived a 
general reluctance on the part of the INS to take seriously labor considerations 
attendant to the presence of unauthorized workers.116 In the words of a former 
Deputy General Counsel, “The INS doesn’t care about what labor unions think. By 
and large, it’s a conservative organization.”117 By contrast, the INS was interested 
in working with the DOL but only to the extent that doing so could help keep the 
number of unauthorized migrants to a minimum.118  
The kind of work culture an agency fosters and the management 
structures it selects may prevent agency staff from fully appreciating the urgency 
or significance of secondary goals. Since its creation in 1933, the INS employed 
deportation as a key strategy in the pursuit of unauthorized immigrants. Then in 
1986, more than 50 years after its inception, the INS inherited the responsibility of 
                                                                                                            
113. Admittedly, the challenges of administering a guestworker program and an 
employer sanctions scheme are not identical. In particular, immigration officials can keep 
track of and monitor workers in guestworker programs, whereas IRCA’s employer 
sanctions scheme relieves immigration officials of this duty by foisting onto employers the 
duty to screen and monitor workers. Still, the two programs pose similar regulatory 
challenges to the extent that both are subject to manipulation by employers. It is on this 
basis that I borrow observations about agency interactions developed in the Bracero context 
to explain similar interactions in the modern employer sanctions context. 
114. See CALAVITA, supra note 8, at 113. 
115. Id. at 9. 
116. See id. at 145. “The INS reaction to unions was not confined to semantics,” 
according to Calavita. Id. She explains that the INS willingly facilitated the entry of 
guestworkers to provide relief for growers facing striking workforces. Id. 
117. Id. 
118. In response to the gradual dismantlement of the Bracero program, INS began 
ramping up its efforts to detain and deport undocumented immigrants. Between 1965 and 
1970, the number of apprehensions tripled. See id. at 151. 
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punishing employers for immigration-related violations as a part of the 
comprehensive changes generated by IRCA.119 Put differently, IRCA posed a new 
enforcement challenge to the INS: It asked an agency, which had spent nearly half 
a century building an expertise on how to detain, exclude, and deport noncitizens, 
to begin regulating employers, who were almost always citizens.120 Moreover, this 
set of enforcement targets wielded much more power and resources and, not 
surprisingly, demonstrated a greater ability and willingness to protest.121 Taken 
together, these dynamics suggest that the task of implementing an employer-
centric, interior enforcement strategy would require INS officials to expand the 
boundaries of their traditional mission orientation. 
The goal of transforming INS’s mission found something less than 
resounding success. During the years immediately following the passage of IRCA, 
the DOL sent referrals to the INS identifying employers who had been found to be 
in violation of labor laws, which is useful information given the strong association, 
within certain industries, between labor violations and immigration violations. But 
some studies of the early post-IRCA years noted that there was rarely any follow-
up on these referrals, and it further suggested that a part of the reason may have 
been INS indifference or antagonism toward these referrals. Michael Fix and Paul 
Hill found that the DOL’s complaint-driven approach to workplace investigation, 
for example, may not have meshed with many INS offices, which embraced a 
“police model” of simply raiding workplaces upon receiving a tip.122 As one INS 
agent explained, “[The] DOL picks up paperwork violations, and we don’t do 
paperwork violations.”123  
B. Agency Coordination Without Agency Monitoring 
Here, I discuss two important attempts to coordinate immigration and 
labor enforcement activities. At a glance, these interagency arrangements evince 
                                                                                                            
119. Moreover, as I explain in other work, IRCA was the result of changing 
public attitudes toward employers. As the public became increasingly concerned with the 
growing unauthorized population, more and more states passed employer sanctions laws. 
See Lee, supra note 12, at 1110–13. Employers shouldered a significant amount of blame 
for public dissatisfaction with the immigration system as they were seen as benefitting from 
and sometimes facilitating unauthorized migration. See id. at 1132–43. 
120. Id. at 1127 (describing INS’s attempts to change its workplace culture to 
accommodate the new mandate). 
121. See Martin & Miller, supra note 88, at 32 (“[I]nstead of dealing primarily 
with individuals who were often not US citizens and who tended not to protest poor service 
and inconsistent advice, the INS in sanctions enforcement had to deal with US employers 
who had in-house attorneys and often close contact with political leaders.”); see also Lee, 
supra note 12, at 1113–19 (describing the challenges associated with immigration 
screening); Wishnie, supra note 25, at 210 (“[E]mployer sanctions target employers, not 
undocumented immigrants, by obligating employers to verify status and to refuse to hire 
unauthorized workers. Federal immigration authorities have traditionally targeted non-
citizens, however, and this reorientation may not be fully embraced within the immigration 
agency . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
122. Michael Fix & Paul Hill, Implementing Sanctions: Reports from the Field, in 
THE PAPER CURTAIN, supra note 3, at 65, 80–81. 
123. Id. at 80. 
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some of the qualities arising from interagency monitoring arrangements developed 
in other areas of law. But a closer look reveals that these shared qualities are in 
appearance only. Immigration scholars have rightly pointed out that these 
coordination attempts served to further suppress labor rights,124 but a point that has 
not yet been given full expression is that this suppression can be traced to the 
existence of only minimal monitoring power. As a result, ICE has for much of its 
history evaded meaningful oversight in the context of workplace enforcement, and 
it has tended to resist or ignore the labor consequences of its workplace 
enforcement decisions.  
One effort at coordinating immigration and labor enforcement goals has 
involved restricting the kind of information on which ICE can rely in making 
enforcement decisions. The Department of Justice’s 1996 issuance of Operating 
Instruction 287.3a was designed to prevent the INS from “unknowingly becoming 
involved in a labor dispute.”125 The instruction advised, but did not require, the 
officer to affirmatively ask the informant whether a labor dispute was in progress 
or to consult with the NLRB or the DOL as to whether the particular employer had 
a history of labor violations. Importantly, the instruction reaffirmed its advisory 
nature by acknowledging that ICE ultimately possesses the authority to enforce 
immigration laws even where doing so would undermine labor protections.126  
An example of the second type of interagency coordination has involved 
Memoranda of Understanding (“MOU”) harmonizing the various enforcement 
goals of agencies. The INS and the DOL entered into just such a MOU in 1998.127 
During the Clinton administration, the INS and the DOL made an effort to 
coordinate their regulatory efforts, and the 1998 MOU detailed, among other 
things, the kind of information the agencies would share with one another.128 It 
noted in particular that the INS was required to share with the DOL any 
information suggesting that a particular employer may have violated any labor-
related statutes falling within DOL’s jurisdiction.129 The wording of this provision 
is ambiguous,130 and the anecdotal evidence suggests that ICE has alerted the DOL 
only after a workplace has already been investigated.  
                                                                                                            
124. See Wishnie, supra note 87, at 547–48. 
125. INS Operations Instruction 287.3a, reprinted in 74 INTERPRETER RELEASES 
199 (1997) [hereinafter O.I. 287.3a]. 
126. See id. (“Generally there is no prohibition for enforcing the Immigration and 
Nationality Act, even when there may be a labor dispute in progress.”). 
127. 1998 MOU, supra note 88. 
128. It also explained that certain types of information would not be shared. For 
example, the DOL’s Wage and Hour Division was required to review an employer’s 
immigration-related documentation during the course of its own investigation except where 
the investigation was based on a complaint alleging labor violations. See id. at 6. 
129. Id. at 7. 
130. See id. (“When INS obtains or receives information during the course of its 
worksite enforcement activities which indicates a possible violation of statutes within the 
jurisdiction of the DOL, the INS shall expeditiously notify the District Director of the 
appropriate [Employment Standards Administration] field office covering the area in which 
the suspected violation occurred.”). 
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Both of these arrangements have failed to promote the goal of 
harmonizing immigrant enforcement and labor enforcement goals because neither 
gives labor officials meaningful monitoring authority. Neither the operating 
instructions nor the MOU enables labor officials to force the uncomfortable 
conversation needed to impose a stop-and-think effect on immigration officials. In 
the absence of regular such interactions, even immigration officials with capacious 
understandings of immigration enforcement can succumb to blind spots and 
indifference, which can emerge within all organizational contexts.131 Ultimately, 
they highlight the absence of the kind of mechanism that is required to have the 
desired effect: giving the DOL monitoring ability at the pre-enforcement stage. 
Only by moving in the direction of an ex ante constraint (as opposed to the 1998 
MOU, which is ex post in nature) that can be enforced by an external source (as 
opposed to the operating instruction, which provides internal guidance) can any 
interagency arrangement hope to influence ICE. The figure below further 
















To appreciate the shortcomings of these constraints, consider the 
following example: In 2005, 48 immigrant workers in Goldsboro, North Carolina 
came across several posted fliers promoting what was billed as a mandatory health 
and safety training session by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration. 
Upon arrival at the meeting, the workers were promptly detained for removal by 
several DHS officials who had represented themselves as OSHA officials to lure 
these workers out of the shadows.132 The DOL insisted that it was not involved in 
planning this sting operation and set out immediately to clarify to surrounding 
immigrant communities that DHS had conducted the investigation all on its 
                                                                                                            
131. Indeed, these administrative fixes have been seized upon by immigrant rights 
activists concerned with deterring ICE from making workplace enforcement decisions that 
ignore the labor consequences. See NAT’L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR., ISSUE BRIEF: 
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT DURING LABOR DISPUTES (2009), available 
at http://www.nilc.org/dc_conf/flashdrive09/Worker-Rights/emp20_labordispute-infobrief-
2009-11-06.pdf. 
132. See Greenhouse, Immigration Sting, supra note 11; Greenhouse, Officials 
Defend Ploys, supra note 11. 
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own.133 The operating instruction proved to be no deterrent in this case because it 
impinges on ICE’s ability to make enforcement decisions only where a labor 
dispute is in progress,134 which was not the case here. Moreover, although ICE was 
not co-opted into suppressing labor rights in that particular case, its actions 
certainly undermined the DOL and the state labor agency’s long-term efforts to 
promote and facilitate the reporting of labor violations by unauthorized migrants in 
North Carolina. The Goldsboro example also highlights the gaps and shortcomings 
of the 1998 MOU. Immigration officials were required to share information 
regarding labor violations discovered in the course of worksite investigations. The 
MOU did not require these officials to consider whether their enforcement 
decisions would generate negative labor consequences. In other words, to the 
extent ICE considered whether their actions would displace labor law, the MOU 
forced them to do so only after the fact. This arrangement did not force 
immigration officials at the ex ante stage to consider the externalities they would 
impose onto the DOL, the NLRB, or other labor enforcement agencies, thus 
demonstrating a limited ability to encourage ICE to think beyond its narrow 
mission orientation. Permitting workers in removal proceedings to pursue labor 
remedies ultimately imposes costs on employers and not ICE. And whatever gains 
that were realized in punishing an individual employer had to be weighed (to the 
extent they were at all) against the setbacks the DOL experienced by having to 
quash any misinformation within immigration communities about its relationship 
to ICE and about whether reporting a labor violation will actually lead to the 
removal of that worker. 
C. Implications for Redesigning Workplace Monitoring 
The ineffectiveness of current monitoring arrangements suggests that 
reform-minded individuals could benefit from thinking carefully about increasing 
the DOL’s ability to affect enforcement decisions ex ante—that is, before ICE 
begins moving from the target stage to the enforcement stage. Doing so will reduce 
the likelihood that ICE officials will simply resolve ambiguities in favor of swift 
enforcement and create a more effective means for forcing officials to stop and 
think. I have included a graphical depiction below to further illustrate this point. 
                                                                                                            
133. One union official noted: “The word being brought back to worksites after a 
scam like this is that OSHA can’t be trusted. That kind of perception diminishes OSHA’s 
ability to do the critical work of protecting America’s labor force.” Greenhouse, 
Immigration Sting, supra note 11. 
134. The ICE officer must also feel compelled to pursue this line of questioning 
on the snitch. In any event, a clever employer is going to be able to circumvent this 
operating instruction by not volunteering any information about the labor dispute. 
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Conceptualizing labor agencies as monitors can help refine existing 
arguments in favor of expanding the role of labor and employment agencies within 
the immigration universe. For example, Leticia Saucedo has argued in favor of 
expanding the ability of agencies like DOL and the EEOC to utilize the U visa as a 
means for collective resistance by workers against employers.135 She and others 
have argued that increasing the degree of coordination between immigration 
enforcement and labor enforcement agencies is crucial to enabling unauthorized 
workers to assert their work-related rights.136 The monitoring framework 
acknowledges, first, that any partnership entered into by these agencies in the 
context of workplace enforcement will almost certainly involve disagreement, 
negotiation, and perhaps even resentment between the bureaucrats populating these 
agencies, and second, that these tensions nevertheless can be productive if 
structured properly.137 
How should this relationship be structured? Historically, interagency 
arrangements have been either easily circumvented by bad-actor employers (e.g., 
                                                                                                            
135. See Saucedo, supra note 18, at 944–51. 
136. See id. at 941 (arguing that such partnerships “can eradicate exploitative 
employment practices without exposing workers to deportation threats”); see also Rathod, 
supra note 4, at 555–56 (arguing in favor of a MOU between OSHA and DHS requiring 
DHS to refrain from conducting a worksite raid while the target worksite is being 
investigated by OSHA). 
137. One DOL official described the process of engaging DHS as “slowly 
breaking down a building, brick by brick.” Interview with DOL Official (June 23, 2011) 
(conducted on condition of anonymity). This official continued: 
DHS is married to its police power, as is DOL, but our mandate is 
different. Just as DHS is so gung ho about its mission, DOL is gung ho 
about ours. Our investigators can’t do their job if workers fear that 
investigators are somehow undercover ICE agents. It impedes the 
enforcement of our labor laws. . . . [Secretary of Labor Hilda Solis] has 
been adamant about displacing workers’ fears, and this MOU is a tool in 
that fight. 
Id. 
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O.I. 287.3a) or incomplete in their reach (e.g., the 1998 MOU) and thus failed to 
compel ICE to take seriously what are (from its perspective) secondary labor 
goals. Therefore, monitoring offers a way for agencies like the DOL to influence 
the process by which ICE moves from receiving information to actually targeting 
and investigating that worksite. It must be able to force immigration officials to 
stop and think.  
Although the precise contours of worksite reformation are beyond the 
scope of this Article, it is worth elaborating on how monitoring adjustments could 
place greater pressure on ICE officials to take the labor consequences of their 
decisions seriously. One robust form of monitoring would require ICE to obtain 
permission from the DOL before investigating a particular workplace. If, for 
example, ICE received a tip that a particular employer had hired unauthorized 
workers, before proceeding to investigate the workplace, ICE officials would have 
to confer with the DOL and other labor agencies to determine whether a labor-
related complaint had been filed against the employer.138 In other words, the DOL 
would have to affirmatively consent to the investigation before ICE could proceed. 
Such an arrangement would also serve to constrain the overzealous decisions of 
officials blinded by their mission orientation. Drawing inspiration from the Fourth 
Amendment example, this type of ex ante check would act as a constraint on the 
exercise of executive power.139 In a twist on the rationale that police officers are 
likely to see probable cause where none exists, history has shown that ICE officials 
are likely to ignore signs of labor exploitation where plenty exist. 
Another, perhaps more politically feasible alternative would be to require 
ICE officials to conduct a pre-investigation check to determine whether a 
particular worksite is subject to a labor dispute. Given that a bad-actor employer 
would not likely offer up information about an ongoing labor dispute (thus evading 
the reach of Operating Instruction 287.3a), the labor complaint database provides 
an important data point for ICE to consider before making an enforcement 
decision. Such a monitoring scheme would require the creation of a database that 
could be updated by the various federal labor agencies, who are in a position to 
collect such information.140 Regardless of the precise contours of such an 
arrangement, collecting and making available such information can make 
meaningful the protections promised (but not delivered) by O.I. 287.3a.  
The benefits of interagency monitoring extend beyond the narrow context 
of any individual enforcement decision. Rather, over the long-term, structured 
                                                                                                            
138. See Michael J. Wishnie, Introduction: The Border Crossed Us: Current 
Issues in Immigrant Labor, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 389, 390–93 (2004) 
(identifying the strong correlation between worksite raids and the presence of formal labor 
complaints having been filed against those worksites). 
139. See Cynthia Lee, Package Bombs, Footlockers, and Laptops: What the 
Disappearing Container Doctrine Can Tell Us About the Fourth Amendment, 100 J. CRIM. 
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1403, 1410 (2010). 
140. Scholars have advocated for the development of a similar sort of information 
database in other contexts. See, e.g., Alejandro E. Camacho, Adapting Governance to 
Climate Change: Managing Uncertainty Through a Learning Infrastructure, 59 EMORY L.J. 
1, 65 (2009) (arguing that a “publicly accessible clearinghouse for information sharing” can 
help reduce the uncertainty that impedes effective climate change regulation). 
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interactions between agencies can productively inform the formation of strategy 
and policy as these agencies discuss enforcement goals and compliance 
definitions. Several years after IRCA was passed, different agencies began 
assessing whether and to what extent employers were complying with the 
prohibition against hiring unauthorized workers. The INS and the DOL each 
conducted their own studies, with the INS finding a 70–80% compliance rate and 
the DOL determining a 40% compliance rate.141 The DOL deemed an employer to 
be noncompliant if, after a workplace investigation, it sent a notice to the INS of 
the possible presence of an immigration-related violation. Although these two 
agencies could not agree on the meaning of employer compliance, this 
disagreement created the opportunity for what has been referred to in another 
context as a reason-producing conversation;142 it forced each agency to reconsider 
and refine its approach to a common goal.  
Reforms in the mold of ex ante monitoring offer a complement to the 
U visa model of reform, the benefits of which attach at the ex post stage.143 For 
example, the President has activated the DOL’s ability to certify U visas.144 While 
this laudable step provides much-needed relief to exploited workers, the relief is 
ultimately limited in scope. For one thing, with eight million unauthorized 
migrants in the workforce and an annual U visa limit of 10,000,145 it is almost 
certainly the case that many unauthorized workers who have experienced labor 
violations will not gain the benefit of a U visa. Moreover, the language of the 
statute does not expressly recognize the unique set of harms unauthorized migrants 
experience on account of their vulnerable status in the workplace. Rather, 
unauthorized workers have been able to attain relief through the application of 
more generalizable harms, which are applied to their specific circumstances.146 
                                                                                                            
141. See Martin & Miller, supra note 88, at 31–32. According to Martin and 
Miller’s study, the U.S. General Accounting Office also conducted its own study and found 
a 50% compliance rate. See id. at 32 (noting that the GAO surveyed 6000 of the nation’s six 
million non-farm employers and found that only 50% were in compliance).   
142. In developing his theory of covering, Kenji Yoshino argues that coerced 
assimilation should be rejected where there is no supporting reason or where there is a 
reason that has been deemed illegitimate. See KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN 
ASSAULT ON OUR CIVIL RIGHTS 26–27 (2006). 
143. See Saucedo, supra note 18, at 913–14, 942–43. The ex ante/ex post 
distinction is not a firm one as it is applied to the case of U visas. It is, of course, entirely 
possible for the DOL to screen detained workers for U visa eligibility at the back end as a 
part of a larger enforcement strategy that would coordinate with DHS at the front end. It 
remains to be seen whether the 2011 MOU binding DHS and the DOL will lead to greater 
ex ante coordination in this respect. But whether the ex ante coordination is given 
expression through the U visa framework, or through some other monitoring framework, the 
larger point this Article seeks to develop is that DHS’s enforcement discretion in the 
workplace should be constrained in some capacity in the first instance.       
144. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, U.S. Labor Department to Exercise 
Authority to Certify Applications for U visas (Mar. 18, 2010) [hereinafter DOL to Exercise 
Authority], available at http://www.dol.gov/opa/media/press/opa/OPA20100312.htm. 
145. See 8 U.S.C. § 1184(p)(2)(A) (2006). 
146. A noncitizen is eligible for a U visa where she possesses “information 
concerning criminal activity.” Id. § 1101(a)(15)(U)(i)(II). The statute defines “criminal 
activity” as 
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While such a solution is workable, such relief rests largely within the scope of the 
enforcement discretion of immigration officials—which is precisely what the 
interagency monitoring framework attempts to constrain.147 Therefore, unless and 
until Congress amends the scope of the statutory language, the ability of 
unauthorized workers to obtain U visa relief will continue to be circumscribed by 
the generosity of executive discretion.148 In this sense, monitoring and temporary 
visas apply pressure on enforcement decisions from either side in the hopes of 
deterring overreaching. But in another sense, ex ante monitoring can cure one set 
of pathologies that ex post visas cannot: It can help minimize the externalities that 
ICE actions can impose on other agencies downstream.149 A part of the problem 
with the current arrangement is that the DOL exerts little influence over ICE 
enforcement decisions and—as was evident from the Goldsboro worksite raid—it 
is forced to internalize the costs of overzealous worksite raid decisions. So long as 
ICE remains the lead agency in the context of workplace enforcement and operates 
free from constraint, it will almost certainly continue to exercise its enforcement 
discretion in a manner that best serves its interests at the expense of those of the 
DOL.150 Because the immigration bureaucracy is comprised of multiple agencies, 
                                                                                                            
involving one or more of the following or any similar activity in 
violation of Federal, state, or local criminal law: rape; torture; 
trafficking; incest; domestic violence; sexual assault; abusive sexual 
contact; prostitution; sexual exploitation; female genital mutilation; 
being held hostage; peonage; involuntary servitude; slave trade; 
kidnapping; abduction; unlawful criminal restraint; false imprisonment; 
blackmail; extortion; manslaughter; murder; felonious assault; witness 
tampering; obstruction of justice; perjury; or attempt, conspiracy, or 
solicitation to commit any of the above mentioned crimes. 
Id. § 1101(a)(15)(U)(iii). 
147. ICE does not possess a monopoly over the visa certification process. Under 
federal regulations, the DOL and the EEOC are also empowered to certify a worker’s 
eligibility for U visa relief. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(a)(2) (2011) (“Certifying agency means a 
Federal, State, or local law enforcement agency, prosecutor, judge, or other authority, that 
has responsibility for the investigation or prosecution of a qualifying crime or criminal 
activity. This definition includes . . . the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, and 
the Department of Labor.”). 
148. See Saucedo, supra note 4, at 319 (advocating for a statutory amendment that 
would expressly include extortion, witness tampering, obstruction of justice, and perjury as 
qualifying crimes under the TVPA). 
149. For example, one “downstream” consequence of the increase in DHS 
enforcement activity is a concomitant increase in cases that must be adjudicated before 
immigration judges, who are overseen by the Department of Justice. See Mariano-
Florentino Cuéllar, The Political Economies of Immigration Law, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 31). 
150. Other areas of administrative law reflect the importance of the initial 
enforcement decision, particularly where an agency faces a series of decisions related to the 
same regulatory matter. In the related context of environmental regulation, Alejandro 
Camacho points out that 
[i]n most instances, virtually all agency attention and resources are 
directed at the initial decision, regardless of how little information there 
is to make the decision. Once an initial decision is made, whether 
regarding an individual project or an entire program, the agency rarely 
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tension and disharmony will persist as constitutive features of the administration of 
U.S. immigration laws. Framed this way, interagency monitoring offers one way to 
harness the tension and diversity of viewpoints into something productive.151 
Therefore, my argument is that interagency tension can be productive provided 
that we can find an arrangement where labor agencies can exert greater influence 
over ICE’s workplace enforcement decisions. Put differently, monitoring requires 
embracing interagency tension while simultaneously reallocating power. 
Over the long term, structured experimentation can benefit policymakers 
by providing them with an empirical record on which they can make more 
informed choices.152 Where two agencies vie for favorable public perception, this 
sort of arrangement can increase an agency’s willingness to expose its otherwise 
shadowy, internal decisionmaking process. For example, during the final years of 
the Bush administration, reports emerged of widespread abuses of unauthorized 
migrant rights, ranging from unsafe workplace conditions to mass deportation 
hearings.153 During such a moment, the public and Congress are primed to reward 
those officials and entities who have worked in the service of affirming rights. 
During that moment, had our administrative state been structured so that the DOL 
played a more prominent role in the regulation of unauthorized workers, one can 
imagine the DOL seizing that opportunity to distance itself from DHS, seeking out 
more resources to carry out its own mandate, and allying itself with those elected 
officials who felt pressure to respond to the abuses. In a study of interagency 
coordination among state agencies, Eugene Bardach observes: 
Almost nothing about the bureaucratic ethos makes it 
hospitable to interagency collaboration. . . . Making the transition 
                                                                                                            
revisits it in any systematic way to adjust the decision or learn from its 
successes or limitations for future actions. 
Alejandro E. Camacho, Transforming the Means and Ends of Natural Resources 
Management, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1405, 1414 (2011) (citations omitted). 
151. Alejandro Camacho’s work is again instructive. He argues that the 
“exceptional uncertainty” posed by climate change is forcing scholars and governmental 
officials to rethink how and why climate change-related information ought to be shared. 
Camacho, supra note 140, at 7. Specifically, he advocates for the adoption of a “learning 
infrastructure” where “legislators [establish] and promote use of a shared information 
infrastructure that provides regulators opportunities to learn from the knowledge and 
experience of other regulators and respond to rapid changes in natural systems, scientific 
knowledge, and technology.” Id. 
152. In the context of the dual enforcement of antitrust laws, William Kovacic 
observes: 
One way to test the merits of different implementation options is to 
conduct a natural experiment with more than one technique. 
Experimentation generates an empirical basis for determining what the 
long-term enforcement should be. Actual experience provides insights 
for adjusting the mix of enforcement institutions by revealing which 
techniques are successful and which are not. 
William E. Kovacic, Downsizing Antitrust: Is It Time to End Dual Federal Enforcement?, 
41 ANTITRUST BULL. 505, 518 (1996).  
153. See SMITH ET AL., supra note 13, at 15–29 (summarizing various instances 
where ICE during the years 2005 to 2008 engaged in enforcement activity that undermined 
labor rights). 
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from an existing way of doing agency business to a new and more 
collaborative way requires actors to withdraw at least temporarily 
from the bureaucratic ethos. They must spurn something they may 
have at least respected if not cherished.154  
Recently, DHS and the DOL produced a new MOU superseding prior 
coordination policies.155 Certain features of this MOU reflect an Executive desire 
to coordinate workplace enforcement decisions at the front end of the investigation 
process. One provision in particular seems promising as a mechanism for 
interagency monitoring: The MOU prohibits ICE “from engaging in civil worksite 
enforcement activities at a worksite that is the subject of an existing DOL 
investigation of a labor dispute during the pendency of the DOL investigation and 
any related proceeding.”156 This provision suggests that DHS’s enforcement 
agenda must yield to labor goals in workplaces where the DOL has already 
asserted jurisdiction. Such an arrangement mirrors many of the kinds of 
interagency monitoring schemes that have developed in other areas of law. By 
recasting the DOL’s jurisdiction as impregnable, the MOU forces DHS to 
accommodate labor law’s interest in protecting unauthorized workers as workers, 
before allowing DHS to pursue immigration law’s interest in them as 
unauthorized, and hence potentially removable, migrants. In this respect, the MOU 
attempts to cure the asymmetric enforcement authority that has troubled workplace 
enforcement policy for years. The MOU is written in a way that divests DHS of its 
ability to displace the enforcement of labor goals, at least where the DOL gets 
there first.157 
Importantly, the MOU leaves open the possibility that the displacement 
will run in the other direction in all other circumstances. In worksites where 
employers are using the unauthorized status of their workers to suppress labor 
dissent and the DOL has not initiated an investigation (or where a labor 
investigation has been initiated but by a corresponding state agency), DHS largely 
remains free to harmonize immigration and labor goals as it sees fit. While other 
provisions in the MOU encourage, or perhaps even require, DHS to consult with 
the DOL before conducting a worksite investigation, these arrangements give the 
DOL what might generously be described as hortatory monitoring power. For 
example, the MOU requires ICE to give the DOL notice of pending workplace 
enforcement activity, unless doing so would violate federal law or otherwise 
compromise the investigation.158 For its part, the DOL agrees to facilitate this 
process by providing ICE with information regarding its own enforcement 
activities to avoid the sort of confusion and conflict that can displace the DOL’s 
                                                                                                            
154. See BARDACH, supra note 107, at 232. 
155. Revised Memorandum of Understanding Between U.S. Dep’t of Homeland 
Sec. and U.S. Dep’t of Labor (Mar. 31, 2011), available at http://www.dol.gov/_sec/media/ 
reports/hispaniclaborforce/dhs-dol-mou.pdf. 
156. Id. at 2. 
157. The MOU also specifically prohibits ICE from engaging in the kinds of 
impersonation tactics used in the Goldsboro, North Carolina investigation. See id. at 3 
(“Under no circumstances will ICE personnel engaged in enforcement activities at a 
worksite suggest that they represent or act for DOL absent the express approval of DOL.”). 
158. See id. 
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labor enforcement goals.159 Therefore, while this recent attempt to harmonize these 
competing goals recognizes discrete moments where DHS can be estopped from 
displacing labor enforcement goals, it remains to be seen whether such an 
intervention is enough to force DHS officials to absorb these labor-centric norms. 
D. The Limitations of Labor Agencies 
A question embedded within the interagency monitoring framework is 
whether an agency like the DOL can be trusted to protect the interests of 
unauthorized workers. Although the DOL’s primary mission is to protect workers 
against work-related exploitation, historically, the DOL has privileged the interests 
of citizen workers over noncitizen workers. This suggests that DOL officials might 
be tempted to shirk their monitoring duties to the extent that a particular workplace 
inspection implicates unauthorized workers and only unauthorized workers. 
Despite the status-neutral nature of U.S. labor laws, the immigration enforcement 
origins of the DOL do give some traction to the concern that it maintains a citizen-
centric orientation.160 At least three reasons help assure that such a distortion, to 
the extent it exists, will not be overly pronounced. 
First, it is not entirely clear that the DOL and other labor agencies will 
necessarily privilege the interests of citizens over noncitizens, even given the 
resource constraints that those agencies face. Although the descriptive picture is 
still developing, at least some of the social science literature suggests that labor 
agency bureaucrats have folded unauthorized migrants into their mandate, 
embraced the status-neutral nature of labor protections, and given little to no 
weight to the perceived moral unworthiness of these migrant workers. As Shannon 
Gleeson has demonstrated, labor agency officials have gone to great lengths to not 
ask any question that might elicit disqualifying information about a worker’s 
                                                                                                            
159. See id. 
160. Immigration enforcement’s labor origins maintain an evocative quality. In 
recent testimony before the House Judiciary Committee, a former ICE officer concluded his 
largely anti-Obama testimony with a reference to the DOL’s immigration past. Retired 
special agent Michael Cutler provided the following testimony:  
A final point. Prior to the Second World War, the Department of Labor 
was responsible for enforcing our immigration laws. The concern was 
that an influx of foreign workers would drive down wages and worsen 
the working conditions of the American worker. . . . Effective worksite 
enforcement can protect our nation and our workers and turn off the 
power to the magnet that draws so many illegal aliens to our country.  
ICE Worksite Enforcement—Up to the Job?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration 
Policy and Enforcement of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 97 (2011) 
(statement of Michael W. Cutler, Senior Special Agent (Ret.), Immigration and 
Naturalization Service) (emphasis added). 
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immigration status.161 These interactions are filled with what King-Kok Cheung 
might refer to as “articulate silences.”162  
Second, organized labor’s position on immigration policy has shifted over 
the last several decades, and certainly since the DOL last wielded primary 
immigration enforcement authority. Therefore, to the extent that DOL officials are 
inclined to respond more favorably to citizen workers, the interests of many 
citizens are tied to their unauthorized counterparts. Given the declining number of 
unionized workplaces, labor organizations have increasingly (if begrudgingly) 
embraced unauthorized workers as allies and not competitors.163 Of course, the 
organized labor community is heterogeneous and the debate over where 
unauthorized workers belong within this community (if at all) is far from settled.164 
But even this initial shift enables the DOL to pursue labor enforcement strategies 
on the assumption that in at least some contexts, the benefits of expanding the 
rights of unauthorized workers will redound to workers more broadly.  
A third reason the DOL will be unlikely to shirk on immigration-related 
workplace enforcement duties is the budget increase that would likely follow any 
such expansion of authority. As others have pointed out, Congress has increasingly 
devoted funds toward interior enforcement strategies.165 Indeed, one program 
within the U.S. workplace enforcement scheme that has actually received an 
increase in funding is the U visa.166 Given that this represents one area of the labor 
and criminal law intersection that finds some degree of synergy, it is not surprising 
that the DOL recently began exercising its authority to certify U visas.167  
                                                                                                            
161. See Shannon Gleeson, “To Protect One, We Must Protect All”: Bureaucratic 
Scripts for Protecting Undocumented Workers 14–15 (Feb. 18, 2011) (unpublished 
manuscript, presented at Immigration Law Symposium, University of California, Irvine, 
School of Law) (on file with author).  
162. See KING-KOK CHEUNG, ARTICULATE SILENCES: HISAYE YAMAMOTO, 
MAXINE HONG KINGSTON, JOY KOGAWA (1993). 
163. See Statement of the Executive Council on Immigration, AFL–CIO (Feb. 16, 
2000), http://www.aflcio.org/aboutus/thisistheaflcio/ecouncil/ec0216200b.cfm (calling for 
legal reforms that extend full labor protections to undocumented workers); see also 
Christopher L. Erickson et al., Justice for Janitors in Los Angeles: Lessons from Three 
Rounds of Negotiations, 40 BRIT. J. INDUS. REL. 543 (2002); Catherine Fisk & Michael 
Wishnie, The Story of Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB: Labor Rights Without 
Remedies for Undocumented Immigrants, in LABOR LAW STORIES 399 (Laura Cooper & 
Catherine Fisk eds., 2005).  
164. See Marc Santora, Immigration: From Talking Point to Sore Point, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 1, 2007, at A1 (noting that labor unions remain resistant to liberal immigration 
policies). 
165. For example, ICE and CBP have a combined operating budget of $15 billion. 
See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., BUDGET-IN-BRIEF: FISCAL YEAR 2008, at 19 (2007), 
available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/budget_bib-fy2008.pdf. By comparison, the 
INS’s budget in 1998 was $3.6 billion. See Jennifer M. Chacón, A Diversion of Attention? 
Immigration Courts and the Adjudication of Fourth and Fifth Amendment Rights, 59 DUKE 
L.J. 1563, 1571–73 (2010) (discussing rising trend of immigration enforcement). 
166. See Teresa Watanabe, U.S. Officials Boost Efforts to Protect Immigrant 
Crime Victims, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2010, at A1. 
167. See DOL to Exercise Authority, supra note 144. 
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To be clear, empowering the DOL does not represent a silver bullet. As 
with any change at the level of culture and group identity, reform-minded 
individuals must take the long view. And because it is both infeasible and 
impracticable to give the DOL immigration enforcement authority, we are left with 
ICE, enforcement discretion, and an assortment of questions as to how best to 
deter the exercise of discretion that perpetuates workplace exploitation. But giving 
the DOL the power to monitor and constrain the exercise of that discretion is an 
important start. It invites us to think more carefully about how peer agencies, and 
not just principals, can police the overreaching of ICE officials. 
IV. EVOLVING MONITORING CHALLENGES 
Within the interagency monitoring framework, changing the culture of the 
lead agency largely depends on sharing information and empowering other 
agencies to shape decisions that are being made on the basis of that information. 
Empowering federal labor agencies to monitor the types of information ICE 
receives has the potential to guide ICE workplace enforcement actions in a manner 
more consistent with IRCA. But this monitoring framework also points the way to 
other areas where labor law faces the threat of displacement on account of 
immigration enforcement tactics. 
Local law enforcement entities have played an increasingly large role in 
regulating immigrants, and in the process, have begun to undermine the assertion 
of workplace-related rights. One of the key challenges thus far has been forcing 
ICE to become more discriminating in the tips and leads it relies on when targeting 
a workplace. Up until now, the primary concern has been ensuring that ICE does 
not unreflectively act on an employer tip given the strong incentives employers 
have to report unauthorized workers at the first sign of labor-oriented activity. But 
local immigration enforcement creates more potential sources of information on 
which ICE can rely when targeting a workplace. As local immigration enforcement 
becomes more prevalent, crafty employers can report incompliant workers to local 
law enforcement officers who are not covered by reporting restrictions. A recent 
dispute case in Tennessee exemplifies this dynamic. 
Durrett Cheese Sales hired a number of unauthorized workers from 
Mexico to perform a variety of jobs within its factory, including slicing, 
packaging, and processing cheese for sale.168 These workers performed several 
weeks’ worth of work for which they were not paid.169 After several weeks without 
pay, these workers organized themselves to protest their nonpayment, at which 
point the supervisors fired the workers, ordered them off company property, and 
promptly contacted the local sheriff’s department. When the officers arrived, the 
supervisors informed them that the workers were undocumented (and that they 
should therefore be reported to ICE) and provided them with the relevant 
                                                                                                            
168. Montano-Perez v. Durrett Cheese Sales, Inc., 666 F. Supp. 2d 894, 897 
(M.D. Tenn. 2009). 
169. Id. The workers also experienced other harms. For example, their supervisor 
made “offensive and potentially humiliating comments . . . about their race, national origin, 
intelligence, language, and customs, among other things.” Id.  
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paperwork to facilitate this process.170 The workers were detained, and although no 
state charges were filed against them, a captain in the sheriff’s department reported 
these workers to ICE.171 
The Durrett case highlights the evolving difficulties of policing the 
information that ICE relies on in carrying out its immigration duties. Until now, 
regulatory fixes have focused on constraining the behavior of ICE officials or 
employers and have not had the opportunity to squarely confront a third-party state 
entity that simply “impose[s] the will” of the bad-actor employer.172 At the 
moment of confrontation, had the Durrett supervisor reported the workers to 
ICE—and had the receiving officer suspected that Durrett was in the midst of a 
labor dispute—in theory, ICE would have had to withhold or delay action under 
existing operating instructions.173 But because ICE was notified of these workers 
by way of local law enforcement officers, employers are able to circumvent any 
restrictions developed between ICE and the DOL. Given the growing number of 
local jurisdictions embracing an anti-immigrant posture, a low-level ICE official 
would have little or no reason to suspect that the information she is receiving is 
tainted or that acting on the tip enables an employer to escape liability for labor 
violations. The challenge moving forward, therefore, involves designing 
monitoring arrangements that help ensure that both ICE and local entities 
internalize labor enforcement norms.174  
It is worth highlighting that the Durrett example involved local law 
enforcement officers carrying out immigration-related duties that were completely 
independent of any federal source. Although immigration enforcement authority is 
typically understood to fall within the federal government’s plenary power—and 
thus preemptive of state efforts to encroach on such power—local police face no 
comparable constraints when obtaining immigration-related information while 
carrying out routine policing duties.175 In these situations, given that local law 
                                                                                                            
170. Id. at 898; see also Complaint, Durrett Cheese Sales, 666 F. Supp. 2d  
894 (No. 3:08-1015), available at http://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/ 
Durrett_Complaint.pdf. 
171. Durrett Cheese Sales, 666 F. Supp. 2d at 897.  
172. Id. at 902 (“[T]hroughout the entire process, the County Defendants simply 
imposed the will of the Durrett Defendants, which was to permanently remove the plaintiffs 
from the premises (and, perhaps, the country) because the plaintiffs had complained about 
pay.”). 
173. See O.I. 287.3a, supra note 125.  
174. It is worth noting that a second and related monitoring challenge grows out 
of the increase in federal prosecutions of immigration crimes. In the Durrett Cheese Sales 
case, although the suit between the workers and the employer and sheriff defendants settled, 
the U.S. Attorney in the Eastern District of Tennessee charged those same immigrants for 
using false social security numbers to obtain employment. See Mercer, supra note 10. 
175. See Cristina M. Rodríguez et al., Legal Limits on Immigration Federalism, in 
TAKING LOCAL CONTROL: IMMIGRATION POLICY ACTIVISM IN U.S. CITIES AND STATES 31, 46 
(Monica W. Varsanyi ed., 2010) (explaining that while “these ancillary enforcement 
measures will compromise trust between the police and immigrant communities, these laws 
are not susceptible to legal challenge on their face and are reflective of standard practice”). 
In 2002, the Office of Legal Counsel of Department of Justice issued a controversial 
opinion explaining that state and local entities had the “inherent” authority to arrest 
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enforcement officers, like those in the Coffee County Sheriff’s Department, will be 
acting independently of federal authority, federal agencies will have no legal basis 
on which they can prevent these enforcement officers from acting on the 
immigration-related information they gather.  
One specific context in which this may play out is in 287(g) agreements. 
In 1996, Congress amended the Immigration and Nationality Act to permit federal 
immigration officials to enter into an agreement with state or local law 
enforcement officers, which effectively deputizes them to carry out immigration 
enforcement duties.176 In 2002, the Executive began entering into Memoranda of 
Agreement (“MOA”) with local jurisdictions interested in carrying out 
immigration duties. By 2009, DHS had 66 active agreements with state and local 
law enforcement agencies in 23 states and 833 active 287(g) officers.177 This 
program, along with other local immigration enforcement strategies,178 is a part of 
                                                                                                            
individuals for immigration violations. See Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant 
Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to the U.S. Attorney Gen., 
Non-Preemption of the Authority of State and Local Law Enforcement Officials to Arrest 
Aliens for Immigration Violations 13 (Apr. 3, 2002), available at 
http://www.aclu.org/FilesPDFs/ACF27DA.pdf. See also CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 32270, 
ENFORCING IMMIGRATION LAW: THE ROLE OF STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT 6–8 
(2009), available at http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/rl32270.pdf (summarizing the 
2002 memo and explaining how it departed from prior OLC opinions). 
176. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. 
L. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). The 
relevant provision is codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2006). Although § 1357(g) specifically 
names the Attorney General, this along with other immigration enforcement duties were 
transferred to the Department of Homeland Security under the Homeland Security Act. See 
6 U.S.C. § 251 (2006). 
177. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OIG-10-63, THE 
PERFORMANCE OF 287(g) AGREEMENTS 2 (2010) [hereinafter PERFORMANCE OF  
287(g) AGREEMENTS], available at http://www.dhs.gov/xoig/assets/mgmtrpts/OIG_10-
63_Mar10.pdf. 
178. Two are worth highlighting. The Secure Communities program allows 
partnering jurisdictions to access a biometric database that includes information about the 
immigration status of the people local officers detain. Under the program, local law 
enforcement agencies submit the fingerprints of the arrestee, and if they match those of 
someone in the database with a criminal record, the arresting officers will be notified. See 
Secure Communities: A Fact Sheet, IMMIGRATION POLICY CTR. (Nov. 4, 2010), 
http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/just-facts/secure-communities-fact-sheet. The Secure 
Communities program has emerged as a central part of the Obama administration’s strategy 
for targeting noncitizens who have been convicted of a removable crime. According to a 
recent study, 83% of people arrested through this program are placed in detention as 
opposed to only 62% of individuals arrested through other channels. AARTI KOHLI ET AL., 
CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN INST. ON LAW & SOC. POLICY, SECURE COMMUNITIES BY THE 
NUMBERS: AN ANALYSIS OF DEMOGRAPHICS AND DUE PROCESS 2 (2011), available at 
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Secure_Communities_by_the_Numbers.pdf. DHS aims 
to cover 100% of jurisdictions by 2013. See Secure Communities Deployment as of January 
7, 2010, available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/sc-dep.pdf. The 
other enforcement strategy is the Criminal Alien Program where local jail officials hold 
arrestees until ICE can screen them. Fact Sheet: Criminal Alien Program, U.S. 
IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT (Mar. 29, 2011), http://www.ice.gov/news/ 
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a larger interior enforcement strategy that has been embraced by both President 
Bush and President Obama: ramping up efforts to target criminal noncitizens 
through partnerships with local law enforcement agencies.  
In theory, 287(g) agreements present an opportunity to mitigate the 
Durrett problem. If the problem is that bad-actor employers are able to circumvent 
informational constraints by providing tips and leads through local police, then the 
contract-driven nature of 287(g) agreements provides a potential fix: DHS could 
simply write into the MOA terms the requirement that local agencies refrain from 
exercising its federally conferred immigration authority if doing so would 
perpetuate labor violations. These entities would have to promise not to use their 
immigration authority to subvert labor protections as a condition of receiving that 
authority. But the 287(g) program has reflected significant implementation 
problems. A core challenge has been to ensure that local officers exercise their 
delegated authority in a manner that actually furthers the program’s purpose.179 As 
is the case with many of these partnerships, acting under federally conferred 
immigration authority enables local law enforcement officers to do more. They can 
undertake actions that would otherwise by prohibited if they were acting under 
their traditional state criminal law enforcement authority.180 Although reform 
efforts may be underway,181 the reality is that DHS already faces considerable 
                                                                                                            
library/factsheets/cap.htm. See also Chacón, supra note 165, at 1582–98 (summarizing 
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179. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-109, IMMIGRATION 
ENFORCEMENT: BETTER CONTROLS NEEDED OVER PROGRAM AUTHORIZING STATE AND 
LOCAL ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL IMMIGRATION LAWS 15 (2009), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09109.pdf (noting that one problem has been the lack of 
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challenges in ensuring that local law enforcement officers comport with federal 
priorities.182 
CONCLUSION 
Several agencies must grapple with the phenomenon of unauthorized 
migration, and as a result, these agencies often stand at cross-purposes. In this 
Article, I have endeavored to show that, although these tensions have generated 
some pathologies in the context of workplace enforcement, they need not always 
be counterproductive. Specifically, I have argued that empowering the Department 
of Labor and other labor agencies to monitor immigration enforcement decisions at 
the ex ante stage can help reduce externalities that impact such agencies. Doing so 
can also draw into sharper relief emerging vulnerabilities as labor law, 
immigration law, and criminal law continue to find common ground. There is still 
much to be learned, but in the meantime, this Article urges reform-minded 
individuals interested in improving workplace enforcement to consider ex ante 
monitoring options as one way to disrupt and prod the current system-wide stasis. 
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